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INFERENCE RULES AND 
PROOF PROCEDURES FOR INEQUATIONS 
CHILUKURI K. MOHAN,” MANDAYAM K. SRIVAS,*+ AND 
DEEPAK KAPUR’ 
D The negation of equality is an important relation that arises naturally in 
the study of equational programming languages and logic programming 
with equality. Proving and solving equations and inequations may also 
constitute subtasks in constraint logic programming. In this paper, we give 
forward (i.e., nonrefutational) techniques for proving the negation of 
equality in a theory. We develop a complete inference system to check 
whether an inequation is a logical consequence of a given system of 
equations and inequations. The inference system is used to develop a 
goal-directed semidecision procedure which uses a narrowing technique 
for proving inequations. A decision procedure is obtained when certain 
additional conditions are satisfied. The semidecision procedure for proving 
inequations is also modified to obtain a semidecision procedure for solving 
inequations in a theory, i.e., finding a substitution such that the corre- 
sponding instance of the given inequation is a logical consequence of the 
given system. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The negation 
of equational 
of equality is an important relation that arises naturally in the study 
programming languages and logic programming with equality. Prov- 
ing and solvmg equations and inequations may also constitute subtasks in con- 
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straint logic programming. In this paper we study equational reasoning in the 
presence of inequations, i.e., negation of equations with variables universally 
quantified. 
2. I. Motivation 
Equational programming languages constitute an important class of logic program- 
ming languages. Several equational languages and their implementations using the 
techniques of term rewriting have been proposed [7-9,11,13] in recent years. 
Unlike languages like PROLOG in which “equality” refers to the syntactical 
identity relation, equational languages reason with full equality in a theory defined 
by the program constituents. In the underlying logic of an equational program, 
“ = ” is an equivalence relation that satisfies the substitution property. 
Declaratively, an equational program consists of a set of equational axioms, in 
which every variable is assumed to be universally quantified. Operationally, an 
equational program is viewed as a set of oriented equations (rules) in which 
“execution” proceeds as follows: any term matching with the lhs of an equation 
can be replaced by the corresponding rhs. Typical problems solved using an 
equational program with this simple operational execution mechanism are: (a) to 
find a “simplest” term equal to a given term, and (b) to check whether two given 
terms are equal. 
The expressive power of equational programs is naturally extended with the 
if-then-else operator, which is useful in the concise and elegant axiomatic specifi- 
cations of data types and functions [12]. For example, the fetch operation on an 
array data type can be specified by the equation 
(0) fetch(assigda, i, xl, j) = (if i =j then x else fetch(a, j)), 
or equivalently by the conditional equations 
(1) i = j 3 fetch(as.@da, i, xl, j> =x, 
(2) i #j - fetch(a.ssign(a, i, x), j> = fetch(a, j>. 
The inequation i f j occurs explicitly in (21, and is implied in the else part of (0). 
it is necessary to understand reasoning in systems of equations and such inequa- 
tions (negations of equations with variables universally quantified, e.g., Vi, j. i f j) 
before conditional equations with inequations are explored. The need for using 
inequations arises naturally when we attempt to build complete data type and 
function specifications and reason with them. Sometimes, it is necessary to make 
use of certain unstated inequational assumptions such as the free constructor 
assumption [e.g., nil + cons (x, y) is often used in reasoning about list specifica- 
tions]. In this paper, we study reasoning in systems which consist of equations and 
inequations with universally quantified variables; some of the results given here 
were presented in [25], and are also contained in [26]. 
Equational reasoning in the presence of inequations is also relevant to the 
recently proposed “constraint logic programming” class of languages (CLP) [16]. 
CLP attempts to incorporate procedures for solving special kinds of constraints 
into a logic programming framework in a useful way. Several constraint-solving 
techniques have been investigated recently in the context of CLP [l, 17,21-231. 
While some of these works do consider negative constraints, they are applicable 
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either in the empty theory (i.e., syntactic unifiability and nonunifiability) or for a 
specific theory, such as linear arithmetic. It would be useful and important to 
extend constraints to those that require determining whether or not (instances of> 
two terms are equal in a given finitely specified equational theory supplemented 
with a set of inequations. Equational reasoning is also likely to play an important 
role in determining canonical forms for constraints in constraint logic program- 
ming as discussed in [23]. 
1.2. Related Work 
Reasoning with the positive “ = ” relation in equational systems is fairly well 
understood: the first completeness result for equational reasoning was obtained by 
Birkhoff [2]. Such is not the case when reasoning with the “ + ” relation: the 
central problem is that of giving methods for proving inequations. This problem is 
nontrivial, since “ # ” is not just the syntactic nonidentity of terms, nor is it an 
independent relation; inequations interact with equations, producing new (inequa- 
tional) consequences. We address the following crucial question: how can we infer 
any inequation which is the logical consequence of a given system of equations and 
inequations? 
Most current equational languages circumvent the issue of inequations by 
treating the “ # ” relation as the logical negation of an explicitly defined equality 
predicate for each domain. This method is not generally applicable, and leads to 
unnatural specifications. For instance, p # LJ is then expressed as “eq( p, q) = false” 
[27]. Such an approach makes an artificial distinction between the “eq” predicate 
for the domain and the logical equality relation on terms defined by the specifica- 
tion. That is awkward because there is usually no inherent reason to define the 
equality predicate separately; the notion of equality is directly defined by the 
specification, whose axioms are viewed as formulas in equational first order logic. 
Current approaches to studying inequations broadly fall into the following cate- 
gories: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
refutational techniques which derive a contradiction after adding the 
skolemized negation of the goal to the system [14,30]; 
the default assumption of two terms being not equal when their equality 
cannot be proved using a reasonable inference system [24,261; 
finding a ground substitution which “solves” inequations in the empty 
theory (i.e., given s # t, finding u such that su, ta are distinct ground 
terms) [5,6,19]. 
1.3. Ouerciew and Main Results 
In this paper, we investigate a new forward approach for deriving inequational 
consequences, similar to the one (proposed by Birkhoff 121) traditionally used for 
deriving equational consequences. Our approach is different from (2) in that we 
derive inequations which hold in ecery model of a given system. Unlike (3) and (2), 
we study arbitrary finitely specified equational theories. Unlike (11, the refutational 
approach, inequations are deduced directly from given axioms using inference 
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rules. We refer to such proofs of inequations as forward proofs as opposed to 
refutational proofs. We formulate inference rules that are forward complete, i.e., 
every logical consequence of a set of equations and inequations is deducible by 
repeatedly applying these inference rules. 
Forward proofs of equational consequences can be constructed using the 
traditional equality inference rules: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitu- 
tivity. A natural way to construct forward proofs of inequations is to use inference 
rules (I,) that are formulated as contrapositives of the equational inference rules 
(E,), given by the following schema (where A denotes a set of equations): 
(Ek) 
a=b,A c#d,A 
c=d +--) (‘k) azb 
For example, from the substitutivity inference rule of equality, one can construct 
an analogous inference rule for inequations as follows: 
S1=tl,S2=t2 Sl=tlYf(Sl,S2) +f(t1,t2) 
f(s,,s,> =f017t*) + + s2 + t2 
There are several reasons for preferring forward proofs of inequations to 
refutational proofs. Unlike refutational proofs, forward proofs do not perturb the 
program/specification environment by adding a skolemized literal. Such perturba- 
tion complicates matters when the property being proved is just a subgoal in a 
larger proof, e.g., when it is necessary to prove the antecedent of a conditional 
equation which contains inequations. If refutational methods are used, all other 
consequences of adding the new (skolemized) literal must be discarded before 
continuing the proof. On the contrary, all results obtained using forward proofs are 
logical consequences and can be stored and used subsequently in proofs of other 
inequations and equations. Forward proofs are conceptually simpler, and have a 
more appealing constructive flavor which is missing in refutational proofs which 
survive on excluded middles. In this aspect, they resemble proofs in natural 
deduction systems [lo, 201. We believe that the insight provided by the study of 
forward proof methods for inequations will be helpful in developing better proof 
procedures for them. The procedure developed in this paper is based on a 
combination of the forward proof method studied here and an important result we 
prove about the structure of proofs of inequations. 
The main results of the paper are the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
A refutationally complete basic set of inference rules Z?, is obtained in 
Section 3 by taking the contrapositives of a set of traditionally used equa- 
tional inference rules. It is shown, however, that R, is not forward com- 
plete: not all inequational consequences are deducible using R,, because 
the contrapositive of the substitutivity inference rule is not sufficiently 
powerful. For example, although we can deduce f(s, t) =f(t, s> from s = t 
using the substitutivity inference rule (E4), we cannot deduce s + t from 
f(s, t) #f(t, s) using its contrapositive. 
In Section 4, we develop a forward complete set of inference rules R, by 
generalizing the subterm inference rule for inequations. R, introduces 
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(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
inference rules for deducing a conditional consequence relation “ - “; intu- 
itively, t, - t, signifies that t, = t, holds in the theory if I = r is as%med. In 
R,-proofl:‘an inequation 1 z r is deduced from m # n and m - n. The 
proofs in R, are like natural deduction proofs in that they use a &cial set 
of inference rules for deducing conditional equations, i.e., equations with the 
assumption 1 = r. 
In Section 5, we formulate a semidecision procedure Provelnequation for 
deriving inequational consequences of a given system, using the result that 
every inequational consequence has an R,-proof in which exactly one 
inequational axiom is used. From this result, it immediately follows that to 
check for the consistency of a system of equations and inequations, it is 
sufficient to check, for each inequation i, whether the combination of all the 
equations with the inequation i is consistent. This is an instance of a 
phenomenon that Lassez and M&loon have called “independence of 
negative constraints” in [221, which appears to occur in a variety of domains 
with a variety of constraints. In [5] this is shown for solving a system of 
equations and inequations in the empty theory; in [22] it is shown for linear 
constraints over the reals. Such a result can often help in improving the 
efficiency of decision procedures. In particular, consistency of a system of 
equations and inequations can be checked in parallel, as inequations do not 
interact with each other in the consistency check. 
If E is the subset of equations in the given system S, and if the equational 
theory T of 2 U {skoZem(s = t)} has a (decidable) T-unification algorithm, 
then we have a decision procedure for determining whether S b s # t. 
In Section 5, we also formulate a semidecision procedure Solvelnequation 
for solving inequations in the theory defined by a given system. 
2. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we present the definitions, notation, and equational inference rules 
used in the rest of the paper. We also state the forward completeness result for 
equational inference rules, and formalize a few useful properties regarding the 
structure of proofs of equations and inequations. 
2.1. Terms, Substitutions, and Unifiers 
The language considered contains a finite 
disjoint from a (denumerably infinite) set of 
number of function symbols (E F), 
variables (E V). We denote variables 
by characters U, u, w, X, y, z toward the end of the alphabet, possibly subscripted. 
A term is a variable, or is a constant (E F), or is of the form f(t,, . . . , t,> where 
f EF and tl,..., t, are (argument) terms. By s = t, we denote that the terms s and 
t are identical; contrariwise, s f t denotes that they are not identical. A term s is a 
subterm of another term t iff either s = t, or s is the subterm of an argument of t. 
A term s is a proper subrerm of t iff s is a subterm of t but s + f. We write t[s] to 
80 C. K. MOHAN, M. K. SRIVAS, AND D. KAPUR 
indicate that s is a subterm of t; replacement in t of an occurrence of the subterm 
s by p is denoted t[s +- pl. 
A substitution is a mapping from variables to terms, denoted by the symbols 
r, p, (T, 0 (possibly subscripted). The identity substitution maps every variable to 
itself. The result of uppfying a substitution IT to a term t is another term (ta> 
obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of the variables in t by the 
terms to which u maps them. Skolemizution of a term t is the application of a 
special substitution skolem mapping all variables of t to new constants ( e F). The 
composition of substitutions is denoted by concatenating them; if t,a, = t, and 
t,a, = t,, then t,(a,a,) = t,. A substitution u is more general than the substitution 
p iff 38Vt[taO = tp]. Among a given class of substitutions C, a substitution u E C 
is most general iff Wp E X)30’v’t[ta0 = tp]. Two terms p, q are unifiable iff they 
have a unifier, i.e., a substitution u such that pa = qu. Every pair of unifiable 
terms has a most general unifier (m.g.u.) which is unique up to renaming variables. 
2.2. Equations, Inequations, and Interpretations 
An equation (or positive literal) is a two-tuple of terms written with the infix 
operator “ = “. Similarly, an inequation (or negative literal) is a two-tuple of terms 
separated by “ # “. A literal is either an equation or an inequation. A system is a 
finite set of literals. An equational system contains only equations, while an 
inequational system contains only inequations. 
An interpretation /.L is a mapping from ground literals to (true, false), and is said 
to be consistent if j~( p = q) f F( p # q) for all ground terms p, q. A literal P holds 
in p if I = true for every ground substitution u. An E-interpretation of a 
system S is a consistent interpretation p such that every literal in the reflexive, 
symmetric, transitive, substitutive closure of the equality relation defined by S 
holds in p. We say S k P (“S entails P”) if P holds in every E-interpretation of S. S 
is E-unsatisfiable (or inconsistent) if it has no E-interpretation; otherwise, S is 
E-satisfiable. 
The T-unification of a given pair of (possibly T-unifiable) terms s, t with respect 
to a set T of equational FOPC formulas is the problem of finding a T-unifier, i.e., a 
substitution u such that T F (su = tu>. Note that T-unifiable terms may not have a 
unique most general T-unifier. 
2.3. Proof Trees 
A forward proof of a literal P from a system S, using a set of inference rules R, is 
a proof tree whose root is that literal P, and whose nonempty leaves are axioms 
(E S), such that every nonleaf node is a literal obtained by applying one of the 
inference rules in R to the literals that are the children of that node. When such a 
forward proof of P exists, we say S +R P (“S derives P using R”), omitting the 
subscript R when the context is clear. Proof trees are depicted with child nodes 
just above their parent node. R is forward complete (“complete”, for short) if 
S k P 3 S kR P for every system S and every literal P. 
A refitution(al) proof of a literal P from a system S using a set R of inference 
rules is the forward proof of q (or some instance of x #x) from the system 
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S u (skolem( ’ P)} using R. The set R is said to be refutationally complete if for 
every literal P and system S, S k P implies that S U {skolem(‘PN FR 0. 
2.4. Equational Inference Rules 
The following is a complete set of simple equational inference rules which can be 
used for deducing equations from other equations. 
Theorem 1. Et!ery equational consequence of a system can be deduced using E = 
{EO, El, E2, E3, E4}, consisting of the following inference rules: 
Reflexivity : CEO) ~ 
P,=P 
P=4 
Symmetry: (El) ~ 
4=P 
Transitit?ty : (E2) ’ = ” ’ = ’ 
p=r 
Instance: (E3) 
P=4 
pa=qu 
Super-term : (E4) 
PI =q1,...> p,=q, 
f(P ,,...>P,) =f(q,F...>qJ 
PROOF. See 121. 0 
2.5. Structure of Proofs 
Here we characterize a few useful properties of the general structure of the proof 
trees in our inference systems. These will be used later in the proofs of several of 
our theorems. Proposition 1 states that every proof of an equation using the 
inference rules in E can be organized so that reflexivity (EO), symmetry (El), and 
instance (E3) steps can all be done before any of the superterm (E4) inference 
steps are performed, and all the superterm (E4) steps are done prior to any of the 
transitivity inferences (E2). 
Proposition 1. The proof tree of any equation can be transformed into another proof 
tree for the same equation in which applications of transitivity (E2) are not followed 
by those of any other inference rule, and applications of the super-term rule (E4) are 
followed only by transitivity (E2). 
PROOF. The proof consists of performing a series of transformations on a proof 
tree to move all the (E2) steps towards the root, followed by another series of 
transformations to push the (E4) steps. The details are given in Section A.3 of the 
Appendix. 0 
Inequational inference rules typically use one inequation and zero or more 
equations to deduce another inequation. Such inference rules are of no use in 
deriving equations; conversely, inequations are neither premises nor results in 
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applications of equational inference rules ( E El. The following proposition formal- 
izes these useful observations. 
proposition 2. Let R be a set of inference rules consisting of the rules in E = 
(EO, El, E2, E3, E4} as well as any other inference rules (for deducing inequations) 
with the following structure: 
l#r,s1=tl,s2=t2 ,..., sk=tk 
P#9 
Then, for any system A and any terms p, q, we have the following: 
(2.1) An independence result for deduction of equations: IFA FR p=q THEN 
there is a proof of p = q from A using R which uses no inequational axiom 
E A and involves only the inference rules in E. 
(2.2) An independence result for deduction of inequations: IF A FR p # q 
THEN there is a proof of p # q from A using R which uses some equations 
EA and exactly one inequation EA. 
PROOF. (2.1): In each of the equational inference rules (EO-E4), no premise is an 
inequation. In other inference rules of the kind given above, the inferred literal is 
not an equation. Hence every literal in the proof tree of an equation is an 
equation. 
(2.2): There is exactly one inequation among the premises of each inference rule 
which infers an inequation. Hence, in the proof tree of an inequation, at most one 
literal at each level is an inequation, and precisely one leaf of the proof tree must 
be an inequation. The proof tree has a unique chain of inequations, from the root 
to a leaf. 0 
A stronger version of (2.2) is proved later as Theorem 3. 
As a special case, substitute p for q in (2.2) above: if A I-~ p #p, then there is 
a proof of p #p which invokes zero or more equations and exactly one inequation 
in A. So if there are no inequational axioms, p #p cannot be deduced and the 
system is consistent. Since p =p is obtained by equational reflexivity, any deriva- 
tion of p #p (abbreviated “ 0 “1 using sound inference rules indicates that the 
system is inconsistent, 
3. INFERENCE RULES FOR INEQUATIONS 
We first introduce a set of inference rules for deducing inequations which are 
inspired by the equational inference rules (E E) given earlier. We show (Theorem 
4) the refutational completeness of a subset (basic set R,) of these inference rules 
along with E. We also prove a result (Theorem 3) which is used in proving the 
main results that follow in subsequent sections. This theorem shows that a 
refutation proof can always be organized into a certain standard form in which 
only one of the inequation axioms of the system is used. 
The following are inference rules that derive inequations, with an inequation as 
one of the premises. 11,12,14’ are the contrapositives of the equational inference 
rules El,E2,E4 respectively. 13, like E3, allows instantiation, implementing im- 
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plicit universal quantification of variables. IO is a redundant rule, indicating that 
“ 0 ” represents a contradiction. 
Refutation : 
Symmetry : 
Transitivity : 
Instance : 
Subterm : 
P#P 
(IO) - 
0 . 
P+q 
(11) -. 
q+P 
(12) 
p+q,q=r 
p#r ’ 
(13) 
P#q 
pu#qa’ 
)..., p,) #f(q,,...,q,,...,q,), 
Pk-1 =qk-1, Pk+l =qk+l,*.*, Pn =q,I 
P, # qk 
Theorem 2 (Soundness of inequational inference rules). Every inequational inference 
rule B’ven above is sound: if the premises of a rule hold in all E-interpretations of a 
system, then so does the consequence. 
PROOF. Inference rule IO is sound because (VP) p = p holds in every 
E-interpretation; there is no consistent interpretation in which p #p holds. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Let A up + q. In no E-interpretation of A is it possible that pa = qa for 
any u. The symmetry of equality implies that qu = pa also cannot hold for 
any (T in any E-interpretation of A. Hence A b q fp, and I1 is a sound 
inference rule. 
Similarly let A I= p # q as well as A F q = r. This implies that pa Z qu and 
qu = ru hold in every E-interpretation for A, for every substitution U. It is 
impossible that pu = ru holds in any such E-interpretation, since equa- 
tional symmetry and transitivity would then imply that pa = qu holds, 
contradicting the consistency of the E-interpretation in which pu # qu 
holds. Thus, instances of p and r are not equal in any E-interpretation for 
A, so that A up # r, and inference rule 12 is sound. 
Soundness of I3 is straightforward, since all variables in p Z q are assumed 
universally quantified: if A K (Vx.p # q), then A 6pu # qu for any substi- 
tution U. 
Let A bf(p,, . . . , P,) +f(q,, . . . , q,,) and also A t=pi = qi Vi f k (1 I i I n), 
implying that every instance of pi = qi holds in every E-interpretation of A. 
Suppose A has some E-interpretation I_L in which pka = q,@ holds, for 
some substitution U. Then, f(p,, . . . , ~,,)a = f(ql,. . . , qn)u holds in p, since 
E-interpretations contain the substitutive closure of equations. This contra- 
dicts A kf(pl,. . . , p,J f f(ql,. . . , qn), the initial assumption. Hence, in- 
stances of pk, qk cannot be equal to any E-interpretation of A. Hence 
A t=pk # qk, and 14’ is sound. 0 
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The study of completeness of the inequational inference rules is the main 
concern of the rest of this section and the next section (which concentrates on 
forward completeness). We start by considering the basic set of inference rules 
R, = E U {IO, 11,12,13}. In the next section we will consider the set R, = R,, U {14’}, 
which includes the subterm inference rule, as a starting point towards forward 
completeness. 
Theorem 3, below, shows that from every inconsistent system S one can 
construct a “canonical” refutational proof using the rules in R,, such that 
(1) exactly one inequation from S is used in the proof, and 
(2) the only inequational inference rules used are the instantiation rule (13) 
followed by a single step of the transitivity rule (12). 
The existence of such a canonical R,-proof tree is crucial for showing the forward 
completeness theorem in the next section, and for the semidecision procedure for 
inequations to be developed later. Note that this result strengthens the indepen- 
dence result for deduction of inequations stated in Proposition 2.2 earlier. Theo- 
rem 4 shows the refutational completeness of R,. 
Theorem 3. Zf A t-Ro III, then A k-R” ( pp = qp) for some inequation ( p # q) E A and 
some substitution p. 
PROOF. We show that whenever A kR,, 0, any R,-proof of q from A can be 
transformed to the following form, which includes as a subtree the R,-proof of 
qp =pp for some substitution p, where p # q E A. By symmetry (El), we hence 
have A l-.R,, pp = qp. 
. . . . P+q 
(12) 
q’p=dp (13) pp#qp 
9P#c?P 
Note that from Proposition 2.2 (the independence result for inequations) the 
R,-derivation of •I invokes a unique inequation p # q E A. Starting from such an 
R,-proof of q , we apply a series of transformations on the tree to “pull down” the 
inequation p # q towards the root until it is separated from the root by no more 
than one application of rule 13 (instantiation). The resulting proof tree has the 
desired structure, with qp =pp and pp # qp at the child nodes of the contradic- 
tion. 
The first set of transformations applied transforms the tree so that all instantia- 
tion (13) steps are done right in the beginning, followed by symmetry (11) before 
any of the transitivity (12) steps. Thus, all instantiations of inequations can be 
combined into a single substitution (p). The fact that such a transformation can 
always be done without changing the outcome of the proof tree is shown in Lemma 
3.3 given in the Appendix. 
Lemma 3.4 (given in Section A.2 of the Appendix) shows that in a transitive 
proof tree, i.e., an R,-proof tree that uses only the transitive (E2,12) and symmetry 
(~1,Il) steps, one can always move a given leaf until it is no more than one hop 
from the root. We apply the transformations of the kind described in Lemma 3.4 to 
the transitive part of the proof tree obtained previously, to reposition pp Z qp SO 
that it is one hop from the root, thereby getting the proof tree into the desired 
form. 0 
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Theorem 4 (Refutational completeness of R,). If S k s # t, then 
Su{skolem(s=t)} kR, 0. 
PROOF. The proof is based on the well-known result [4] that for an E-unsatisfiable 
set of clauses S, there is a proof of 0 from S u {x =x) U F, using the inference 
rules of positive hyperresolution and hyperparamodulation, where F is the set of 
functionally reflexive axioms for S. We show that every such resolution proof of 
refutation can be transformed into an equivalent proof which uses the inference 
rules in R,. Details are given in Section A.1 of the Appendix. 0 
4. A FORWARD COMPLETE INFERENCE SET 
In this section, we develop a forward complete set of inference rules CR,). The 
basic set R, is clearly not complete, since it does not contain any rule contraposi- 
tive to the superterm rule (E4). However, R, = R,, U {14’} is also incomplete; so are 
sets of inference rules which include generalized versions of 14’. After progressive 
generalization of the subterm rule, we have forward completeness in the limit for 
R, which contains inference rules capable of deducing “conditional consequences”. 
Proposition 3. R, is not forward complete. 
PROOF. By the example shown below. 0 
Example 4.1. S, = Cf<a, b) Z f(b, a)); prove a f b. 
Inference rules in R, cannot be applied to infer any useful new inequation from 
S,. Hence a # b is not derivable, although {f(a, 6) # f(b, a)} k (a f b). 
4.1. A First Attempt 
Definition. Two terms m, n are 1, r-identical (denoted m = n> if m and n can be 
made syntactically identical by zero or more mutual &placements in them of 
occurrences of 1 by r and of r by I respectively. 
For,example, we have 
f(b,x,g(a,b))~~~f(a,x,g(b,a)) and h(h(h(a))) = h(a). 
h(a), a 
The significance of the = relation is that two terms are 1, r-identical iff their 
equality can be deduced’ ‘from I = r using the rules of equality (E) excluding 
instantiation. A similar “constant congruence” relation was used in [3] and in [31]. 
The indices 1, r of = are sometimes omitted when the context is clear. 
1.r 
Lemma 1 (The = lemma). Let 1, r be ground terms. Then 
1, r 
(I = r} FRO m = n iff m=n. 
[,r 
86 C. K. MOHAN, M. K. SRIVAS, AND D. KAPUR 
PROOF. - : Suppose 11= r] t-,0 m = n, where I, r are ground. Only the equational 
inference rules (EOHE4) can be used to derive an equation, i.e., I = r kE m = n, 
by Proposition 2.1. Each of these equational inference rule preserves the property 
that if the terms in the premises are I, r-identical, then so are the inferred literals: 
CEO): Trivially, s = s. 
(El): If s [=, t, th:; t = s. 
(E2): If s [=, t and t [{ p. then s = p. 
l,r 
(E3): If s = t, then SV!=~ ta (since 1 and r are ground). 
I,r 
(E4): If Vi[ Si r=, ti], then f(~i, . . . , sn> l~rf(t,, . . . , t,). 
= : The converse holds (by definition of - ) even if I, r are nonground, because 
replacements of equals by equals (1 by r:‘Lnd r by 1, in this case) are sound 
equational inferences, given the system {I = r). q 
The restriction that I and r should be ground is needed for the first part (*) of 
the above proof. This is because the check for = does not allow instantiation, 
hence we cannot conclude that instances of 1 and’irare 1, r-identical. For example, 
f(a) and g(a) are not f(x), g(x)-identical, although (f(x) = g(x)] ~z f(a) = g(a). 
We now use the = relation to devise generalizations of the subterm inference rule 
to help formulat~‘~ forward complete set of inference rules. 
Let R, be R, u {14”), with the new inference rule 
m#n,m=n 
(14”) [,r 
l#r ’ 
With the subterm rule generalized to 14”, we can prove (using R2) the 
inequation unprovable by R, in Example 4.1. The next theorem states the forward 
completeness of R, for inequational systems, i.e., systems that consist only of 
inequations. Although such systems are restricted, they are useful in several 
situations. For example, the following system characterizes the fact that the sorts 
integer and list must be distinct: IO # nil, 0 # corzs(x, y), succ(z) #nil, succ(z> # 
codx, YN. 
Theorem 5. R, is (forward 1 complete for inequational systems, i.e., if Q is any set of 
inequations, then Q k (s # t) - Q kR2 (s # t). 
PROOF. Let Q k (s # t), so that refutational completeness (Theorem 4) implies 
Q U ha = ta) FRO 0, where (T is a skolem substitution for s, t. By Theorem 3, 
there is a substitution p such that Q U {sa = tcr} kR, [pp = qp] such that 
(p + q) E Q. By Proposition 2.1 (the independence result for equational deduc- 
tions), we then have {sa = ta) t-a, pp = qp. We conclude (from Lemma 1) that 
PP = qp. Using inference rule I4”, 
sa,tu 
we infer su # ta. Since u is a skolemizing 
substitution, this is equivalent to a deduction of s # t. q 
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Although several more inferences are possible now than before, R, is still not 
forward complete for systems containing equations as well as inequations, as the 
following example shows. 
Example 4.2. S, = {g(a) = h(a), g(b) Z h(b)}; prove a + b. 
Here, although S, U {a = b) derives a contradiction, implying that S, K (a #b), 
no other useful inequation is derivable from S, even if we use 14”. To account for 
this example, we may use R, = R, U {14”‘}, generalizing 14” to the stronger 
inference rule 14”’ defined below: 
m #n, m = m,, n - n,, m, = n, 
(14’“) l,r l,r 
l#r 
For Example 4.2 above, we then have the proof 
(14”‘) 
g(b) #h(b), g(b)~=@r), hUGa=/( g(a) =h(a) 
u#b 
But even R, is incomplete, and sometimes does not succeed in deducing 
inequational consequences from a system. The following example shows that there 
are inequations for which there is a refutational proof but no forward proof using 
the inference rules in R,. 
Example 4.3. S, = {f(u) = h(u), f(b) = g(b), g(u) + h(b)); prove ~2 + b. 
Clearly, S, U {a = b} k-R0 0, hence S, k (a # b). But no other inequation can be 
inferred from S, using the inference rules of R,, and nor can any of the equations 
needed for applying 14”‘. So R, U {14”‘} is not sufficiently powerful to derive 
a # b, and can be further strengthened; we can infer a # b using the inference rule 
14’” given below: 
m#n,m-m,,n=n,,m,=m,,n,=n,,m,=n, 
(14’“) [,r [,r 1-r 
l#r 
However, even R, U {14’“) is not forward complete, and fails to deduce the 
logical consequence a # b from 
S,= {f(a) =h(a), f(b) =k(a), k(b) =g(b), s(a) #h(b)}. 
We can thus define 14m, 141v, 14”, . . . , ad infinitum, so that for any 14N, we have a 
stronger inference rule 14Nf ’ which helps prove more inequations. Each inference 
rule is obtained from the previous one by incorporating one more instance of 
transitivity between = and = . While rnk_] = nk_l is one of the premises of 
142k-1, we have mk_, =mk 5: nk = nk_, in the premises of 142k; similarly, while 
mk =nk is a premise of 142k, we have mk = mk+l =n,+, =nk in the premises of 
142k+1. The following progression illustrates this, showing the chain of reasoning 
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which deduces I # r using each of 14”-14”: 
14” 14”’ 14’” 14” 
mfn m fn m Zn m fn z 
z =: z z E =: 
m, =nl ml nl m, n, 
II II II II 
m2-n2 m2 fl2 
I E 
m3 =n3 
4.2. Conditional Consequence Mechanism 
Each of the sets of inference rules R, = R, U {14&} discussed above can be shown 
to be incomplete. One apparent problem is that we do not have transitivity 
between = and = relations. To handle a proof with any number of occurrences 
of = -literals, we need a rule (or a set of rules) that encapsulates every rule in the 
series (14k}, k > I. 
For this purpose we introduce a new relation called 1, r-equiualence ( - >, 
deduced using the following inference rules. We show that - is a conditi%al 
equality, i.e., S U {I = r) F m = n 3 S b m - n. We then provd’;he forward com- 
l,r 
pleteness of the new inference system R, obtained by adding these inference rules 
to R,,. 
Definition. R_,(l, r) = R, U (EO:,, E2&, E4&, E5;,, 14$, where the new inference 
rules are as defined below: 
m=n 
(EO;,) + 
n 
l,r 
m-n,m#n 
(14&l 13rl ~ r 
m=n 
(BY(,) 
m-n 
131. 
m-n,n-p 
033 I,r l,r 
m-p 
l,r 
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Example 4.4 (Illustration of R,). Let S contain the following literals: 
(a) 0+x=x, 
(b) s(x) + Y = s(x + Y), 
(c) x fy =y +x, 
(d)x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z, 
(e) x+(x+x)=0, 
(f) 0 f s(0). 
Equations (a),(b) define “ + “; (c),(d) state that “ +” is associative and commuta- 
tive; (e) states that x +x is the additive inverse of x; and the last equation (f) 
.C_,. Al_..& r. ,._.A ./n, SPCCillta llldl \I dllU S\V) are %‘z, U‘SL,,L,. -‘z-.+:*rt objects. 
TASK. To obtain the forward proof of s(O) # s&(O)) using the inference rules of 
R,(s(O), s(s(O))), which should be possible if R, is complete, since S F s(0) # s(s(0)). 
The following R,,,-proof comprises three parts (some parentheses and subscripts 
are omitted): 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
By (b), we have ss0 + (SO + SO) = s(s0 + (SO + SO)). The latter term equals 
s(O), because SO + (SO + SO) is an instance of x + (x +x), which equals 0, by 
equation (e) in S. Hence SO - ss0 + (SO + SO) by E5$,,,,. 
so, sso 
ss0 + (SO + SO) is SO, ssO-identical to SO + (SO + SO), which equals 0, applying 
equation (e). Hence ss0 + (SO + SO) aO:sO 0 by EO,“;,, sso. 
. 
so - 0 follows from these two SO, ssO-equivalences. Since SO f 0 is an 
axr%?in S, we finally derive SO f ss0 by 14,&,,. 
The full proof trees are shown below: 
(El) 
x+(x+x)=0 
(E4) 
0=x+(x+x) sx+y=s(x+y) 
(E3) 
sO=s(x+(x+x)) (El) 
(E3) 
s(x+y)=sx+y 
W) 
so = s(s0 + (SO + SO)), s(s0 + (SO + SO)) = sso + (SO + SO) 
so = sso + (SO + SO) 
(E%,ss,,) so 
s,~~s{, sso + (so + so) 
sso + (SO + SO) s”~s” so + (SO + SO) (E3) 
x+(x+x)=0 
W”) (Es”) 
so + (SO + SO) = 0 
sso + (SO + SO) s”;sO so + (SO + SO) 2 so + (SO + SO) - 0 
03”) 
so /asO 
sso + (SO + SO) - 0 
so, sso 
so - sso + (SO + SO) sso + (SO + SO) - 0 
(E2”) so,sso so, sso 0 # so 
so - 0, (11) - so # 0 
(14,w,~~~J 
so, sso _~ 
so # sso 
90 C. K. MOHAN, M. K. SRIVAS, AND D. KAPUR 
4.3. Soundness and Completeness of R, 
4.3.1. Proof of Soundness. The soundness of the inference rules EO;,, 
E2&, E4&,E5;, follows from the soundness of the equational inference rules 
(E E) and the ‘“only if” part (e= j of Theorem 6 which follows. The rule 14p, is 
sound because 
if SkRwm-n 
1.r 
then SU{1=r} FR,m=n (by Corollary 6.2 below), 
implying SU{I=r,mfn)FRO 0, hence SU{m#n}kl#r. 
Theorem 6. Let :, F be gmmd terms. Then 
PROOF. - : Let T be any proof tree for m = n from S U {Z = r} using R,. We first 
transform T into another proof tree TO in which applications of EO (reflexivity), El 
(symmetry), and E3 (instance) are followed by E4 (supertermj and finally E2 
(transitivityj, as in Proposition 1. We observe that TO contains proof subtrees of 
equations derived from S alone and/or {I = r) alone, which interact (become 
siblings in the proof tree) via applications of inference rules E2, E4. By repeatedly 
applying steps (l)-(3) below, TO is transformed into a new proof tree CT,) which 
represents a proof S FR,([,r) m N n. 
l,r 
(1) In the lower part of TO, consisting of equations obtained after applying E4 
and/or E2, change p = q to p - q in every node. This corresponds to 
changing applications of E2 and I% to E2:, and E4&, respectively. Let the 
result be the tree T,. 
(2) In T,, whenever p = q has a parent of the form M - N, insert p - q 
between them, i.e., apply the following transformation: 
l,r [,r 
P’4 
This corresponds to applying rules E5;, and (partially) EOY,. Let tree T, be 
the result of applying this transformation to T,. 
(3) Obtain a new proof tree T3 from T,, replacing by 
M=N 
lr 
M-N 
t,r 
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each subtree (with root M = N) in which only I = r occurs at its leaves: 
l=r 
Ir 
A 
M=N’“““’ ~~ 
M-N’-’ ... 
I,r 
pl:q p r;q 
This transformation completes the introduction of rule EO?,. 
Note that 1, r must be ground (as in the case of Lemma 1) for the above 
argument to hold. Otherwise, I= r could occur as the premise in an instantiation 
inference rule (E3). It would then be impossible to eliminate 1 = r from such a 
proof tree using any of the new R,-inference rules. 
=: For each R,(l, r)-proof tree, there is a corresponding R,-proof tree in 
which 1 = r is a leaf (i.e., is being used as an explicit axiom). For example, the 
equivalent of the deduction 
can be obtained as a proof of m = n by mutually replacing the corresponding 
occurrences of 1, r in them using equational inference rules, since m,n are 
identical up to replacement of 1, r subterms. E5:, holds trivially when “ - ” is 
changed to “ = “. Proof steps using rules E47,, E2;, have straightforward’gqua- 
tional analogs using E4, E2 respectively, with I= r being used as an axiom. I7 
Corollary 6.1. Let Icr = rc be a skdemized instance of an equation I = r. Then 
PROOF. Theorem 6 guarantees the existence of an R,(la, ra)-proof. But an 
R,(la, ra)-proof tree of m - n can always be trivially transformed into an 
R,(l, r)-proof tree of m - n 
la,ru 
by replacing the skolem constants in la and ru by 
new variables distinct frdm every other variable used in the proof tree. q 
Corollary 6.2. If [S tR,(l,rj m l;r n] then [S U (I = r) t-Ro m = n]. 
PROOF. Note that the proof of the e part of Theorem 6 does not rely on 1, r being 
ground. Hence, it holds for nonground terms also. 0 
4.3.2. Proof of Completeness. We need to show that S K P iff S ~~ P, where P 
is an arbitrary equation or inequation in the language. Since E c R,, i” follows (by 
Theorem 1) that S K (m = n) * S I--,_(m = n). The other half of the proof of 
completeness is given as Theorem 7 below. 
The following theorem states that every inequational consequence s # t of a 
system S can be derived using R,,,(s, t). The proof uses refutational completeness 
of R,, together with Theorem 3, to first show that there is an R,-proof from 
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S U {skolem(s = t)) of some equation pp = qp that contradicts an inequation p f q 
in S. By Corollary 6.1, there must be an R,-proof of pp - qp. Rule 14”’ can now 
be applied, yielding an R,-proof of s # t. 
S,f 
Theorem 7. IF S b s f t, THEN S tR,cs,tj s # t. 
PROOF. Let S i= s # t. Let u be a skolem substitution for variables in s, t. Since R, 
is refutationally complete (Theorem 41, we have 
[Sksft]-(SU(sa=tcr}t-R,, 0). 
By Theorem 3, there exists an inequation p # q E S and a substitution p such that 
(s u {sa= ta} kR” q )~(Su{sa=ta}FR,,pp=qp). 
From Corollary 6.1, we have 
(su tsa= ta) kRo P,p =qP) - (SFR,(s,r) PPr;~p) 
Since p # q E S and the instantiation rule (13) is in R,(s, t), we have 
SE R,(s,r) PP # qP* 
Finally, applying 14;, to [PP - qpl and [PP # qpl, we have 
SF R,(s,t) ’ + ‘- Cl 
5. PROOF PROCEDURES FOR INEQUATIONS 
By combining the results of Theorem 3 and Corollary 6.1 we have the following: if 
s # t is a consequence of a system S, then S contains an inequation pi # qi such 
that for some p we can derive pip - qip using R,. This means that to prove s f t, 
we have to find a pi # qi E S and a%bstitution p such that S ~~~ pip - qip. Here 
we address the issue of devising a procedure that searches for such r?l&oof. Any 
such procedure must perform a substantial amount of search to find a R,-proof 
because of the two unknowns involved: (1) the substitution p, and (2) the 
inequation pi # qi. 
There are two possible starting points that a procedure can use in searching for 
a proof: the equational axioms in S or the inequations in S. If one used the 
former, then one would have to direct the application of the inference rules of R,, 
deriving conditional consequences from the equations in S, so as to arrive at a 
pip - qip for some pi # qi in S. While this seems to be a natural approach, it does 
nots’ieem very effective for mechanical generation of proofs. The procedure 
described below uses the second approach. 
Informally, the procedure can be summarized as follows. To prove s # t as a 
consequence of a system S, we check if the two sides of an inequation in S can be 
transformed into a common term by applying “ N -equivalent instantiations” to the 
s,t 
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two sides. More formally, we search for a proof by deriving all possible conditional 
inequa tions 
P * 4 
skoleds, I) 
which are instances of the consequences of the inequations in S under the 
assumption skofem(s = t). The procedure continues until we obtain a conditional 
inequation of the form 
such that M and N are unifiable. (Note: Although in principle it is not necessary 
to skolemize s, t, the search space is substantially reduced by doing so.) A 
conditional inequation is deduced using a mechanism (which uses narrowing [15]) 
called - -narrowing (defined below). This is somewhat similar to deriving inequa- 
tions fr%n S by paramodulating [28] from 1= r and the equations in S into the 
inequations in S. 
Definition. A conditional inequation p Iyrq or q ;~p is ,; -narrowed by S to 
p’ +- q’ or q’ * p’ (using a> if p has a nonvariable subterm M such that either 
pk’; p’ and ‘& = q’, where u is a substitution matching M with 1 or r, or 
3rk’L n E S (or m 
- 
- n E S) such that m and M unify with m.g.u. u, 
p’ = p[ M + n]a, and”;’ = go. 
Soundness of the - -narrowing is ensured, since each - -narrowing by S 
corresponds to replaci$ terms equated by the equations in S % by 1= r. If there 
is a sequence of - -narrowing steps from p + q, where p # q is some inequation 
in S, to m * n, td& soundness ensures that ‘A’” {I= r] b m # n. 
[,r 
procedure ProveInequation(s, t : terms; S : system); 
let (+ be a skolem substitution for variables in s, t; 
c := {P,q+t,9 I P + 4 (5 Sk 
while true’ do 
if r r* r’ E C such that 3p.rp = r’p, 
so, fa 
then return with SUCCESS concluding s # t; 
let a be the oldest unnarrowed member of C; 
C := C - {a} U (5 ( a is - -narrowed by S to 6); 
end while 
end procedure. 
Example 5.1. The system given earlier in Example 4.4 is now used to illustrate 
procedure Provelnequation. This time, we prove that 0 # ~(~(01) is a consequence of 
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the system S containing the following literals: 
(a> 0+x=x, 
(b) s(x) + y = s(x + y), 
(c> x+y=y+x, 
(d)x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z, 
(e)x+(x+.x)=O, 
(f) 0 # s(0). 
We give below the chain of proof steps, beginning from the inequation in S, and 
proceeding via a sequence of - -narrowing steps: 
0, sso 
0 # s(0) 
0 * s(0) 
0, sso 
0 + s(ss0) 
0, sso 
[replacing 0 by ssO1 
0 + sss(0 + 0) 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by 0 +x =x] 
0 + ss(s0 + 0) 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by s(x) + y = s(x + y)] 
0 + ss(0 + SO) 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by x + y = y + x] 
[ - -narrowing by s(x) + y = s(x + y)l 
0 + s(s0 + SO) 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by 0 + x = x] 
0 + $0 + (SO + SO)) 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by s(x) + y = s(x + y)] 
0 + so + (SO + SO) 
0, sso 
o+ 0 
0, sso 
[ - -narrowing by x + (x + x) = 01 
Since 0 unifies with 0, return with SUCCESS: S != 0 # ss0. 
5.1. Completeness of Procedure Provelnequation 
Theorem 8. Procedure Provelnequation is complete for procing inequations, i.e., if 
S k s # t, then ProueInequation(s, t, S> returns with success. 
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PROOF. Let S != s # t, and let I, r represent the result of skolemizing terms s and t. 
The theorem results from the following observations: 
(I) 
(II) 
(III) 
From the proof of Theorem 7, ($3~ f 4 E S>S t-R,,(pp ,,rqp). 
By Lemma X.1 below, p * q can be - -narrowed by S in a finite number 
of steps to some M * N’&h that d’&rd N are unifiable. 
/,r 
The fair (breadth-first) strategy used by procedure Procelnequation guar- 
antees that we eventually derive every conditional inequation obtainable 
by - -narrowing an inequation in S. q 
I, ,- 
To simplify the proof of observation (II) and the next lemma, we use a new 
“complex proof” tree structure, defined as follows. 
Definition. A complex proof is a proof of m I~ n for some unifiable pair m, n, using 
- -narrowing steps as well as applicationsr of inference rules in R,(I, r). 
I, I 
Lemma 8.1. If S kRu(ppI , - qp), where p z q E S, then there is a pair of i.~@~ble 
terms M, N such that p 1 q can be - -narrowed by S in a finite number of steps to 
1.r j,r 
M * N. 
/,I 
PROOF. We start from a complex proof tree whose left subtree represents the 
proof S ER,,, pp - qp, and right subtree contains only p + q. The following trans- 
formation steps,‘gach of which reduces the number of e&rations or - -1iterals in 
I,? 
the complex proof tree, are applied at the root until the left subtree contracts into 
a single equation E S. This process is then repeated for the right subtree, until all 
,; -literals and equations P S are eliminated from the complex proof tree. Finally, 
the complex proof tree represents an execution of Pror~elnequation, consisting 
entirely of - -narrowing steps issuing from some inequation in S, and resulting in 
/,r 
some m + n with m, n unifiable, from which Pror,eZnequation successfully deduces 
l#r. “r 
We show below only the nontrivial transformations-deleting applications of EO 
(reflexivity) and El (symmetry) is straightforward because the definition of the 
- -narrowing mechanism subsumes these rules. Applications of E2:, and E4yr 
ark eliminated by transformations identical to those given below for E2 and E4 
respectively, except that the symbol “ - ” occurs instead of “ = ” in literals in the 
transformations. Similarly, application: ‘of EO” ,.r are eliminated by transformations 
identical to that given below for E5:,, except that the symbol “ = ” occurs instead 
I,? 
of “ = ” in the relevant literals. We abbreviate “ + ” by “ + ” below. 
I. r 
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of “ = ” in the relevant literals. We abbreviate “ ;“, ” by “ + ” below. 
05’) 
m=p,p=n m=p,M*N 
, M*N 
m=n ’ =Iz’ Me[mB +pe] + NB 
MB[ mt3 + ne] * NO ++ Me[me+pe][pe+ne]+Ne’ 
m=n 
(E3) mp=np’ 
M*N 
m=n,M+N 
Mpe[ mpe + ripe] + Npe +* M~[m~+-n~]*N~ 
(where r is more general than pe), 
m=n 
-, M*N 
m=n, M*N 
(E5Tr) M~fj~+-ne]cNB’ ++ Me[mBcnO]+NNe 
Pl =ql,...,Pn=qn 
(E4) 
f(5-i) =f(4i) ’ M*N 
Me[f(pi)e+f(qi)e] me --) + 
P, =qny Me,[p,t4 +q1f41 - en-,[pn-Ien-l +Pn-Ift-ll +w ... k1 
M4[p,4 +41~11 ... ~,[p,~,+-p,~,l +fwh - 0, 
(where (01f92 . . . 0,) is more general than 8, and each of the replacements 
[ piei + qiOi] occurs within the subterm of M which originally unified with f(pi)). 
0 
5.2. Towards a Decision Procedure 
We described above a semidecision procedure for the inherently undecidable 
problem of proving inequations. Using a complete T-unification procedure, it is 
possible to obtain a decision procedure for proving a restricted class of inequa- 
tional consequences of some systems. If there is an algorithm for deciding T-uni- 
fiability of terms for the equational theory of T = {skolem(s = t)} u {equations in 
S), then we can decide whether or not S b s # t. This is done by checking far each 
inequation in S whether its arguments can be T-unified. If some such inequation 
p + q E S has T-unifiable arguments p, q, then 3p.T @pp = qp, which is inconsis- 
tent with p f q E S; hence we decide that S I= s # t. Otherwise, if no inequation in 
S has T-unifiable arguments, we conclude that skolem(s = t) is consistent with S; 
hence s # t is not a logical consequence of S. 
Hullot [15] has developed a sufficient criterion for the decidability of T-unifica- 
tion for an equational theory described by a finite set of oriented equations or 
“term rewriting system” (TRS). Intuitively, a narrowing is basic if each narrowing 
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step acts on (the reduct of) a term containing a nonvariable symbol of the original 
term from which narrowing began (see [15] for the technical definition). A TRS 
satisfies Hullot’s criterion if it is canonical and if every basic narrowing derivation 
from the right hand side of every oriented equation terminates. There is a 
complete decision procedure for T-unification with respect to every equational 
theory T described by a TRS which satisfies Hullot’s criterion. Based on this result, 
we have the following condition: we can decide whether or not s #t is an 
inequational consequence of S if the equations in a system S together with 
skolem(s = t) can be represented by a TRS which satisfies Hullot’s criterion. 
Some simple sufficient conditions can be given for Hullot’s criterion to hold. For 
instance, we can decide whether S K s f t if equations in S’ f S U {skolem(s = t)) 
can be represented by a canonical TRS {lhsi -+ rhsJ such that each rhsi is a ground 
term or a proper subterm of lhs, [181. For example, if S is an inequational sys- 
tem (without any equations), then, for any terms s, t, the equational theory of 
{skolem(s = t>) can be represented by a canonical TRS in which each rhs is a 
ground term; hence the deduction of inequational consequences of S is decidable. 
Also, if (lhsi + rhs,} representing the equations in S is known to satisfy Hullot’s 
criterion, and if neither s nor t unifies with any nonvariable subterm of any lhs,, 
then there is a TRS satisfying Hullot’s criterion with respect to the augmented 
theory (of equations in S’>, and hence decidability of S K s # t. 
5.3. Solving Inequations 
Frequently, an important question asked in logic programming is not whether a 
literal is a consequence of the theory, but whether the literal is “solvable” or 
“satisfiable”, i.e., whether the system entails some instance of the given literal. For 
example, equations as well as inequations may have to be solved when using 
PROLOG-II or constraint logic programs [5, 161. The problem of solving inequa- 
tions in the empty theory has been addressed in earlier work [5, 191, as has the 
problem of solving equations in a theory (T-unification) [151. The natural question 
which builds on these is the problem of solving inequations in a theory. Given a 
system S and an inequation s # t, we address the task of finding a substitution I) 
such that S b SI,!I # t$. 
We observe that a refutational proof method cannot be directly applied to this 
problem. Although a contradiction cannot be derived from S U (skolem(s = t)), it 
may be the case that S + (s$ z tt,b> for some substitution 4. For example, x # y is 
not a consequence of (p # q}, but it has a solution (substituting p for x and q for 
y); needless to say, Ip # q} U {skolem(x = y>) yields no contradiction. 
The procedure we formulate for solving inequations is essentially derived from 
procedure Provelnequation given earlier. First, we rename all variables in all 
axioms of S to be distinct from each other and from variables in s, t. In the 
procedure, G is a set of two-tuples of conditional inequational consequences 
paired with the substitutions which have so far been accumulated for s # t. The 
new procedure Solvelnequation differs from procedure Provelnequation in the 
following respects: 
(1) the given terms s, t are not skolemized; 
(2) conditional consequences are w -narrowed with the the current instantia- 
tion of s = t; and 
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(3) we keep track of the - -narrowing substitutions successively made on s = t 
at each stage, and the final answer returned is the composition of these 
substitutions. 
We ignore substitutions which do not affect s, t -this is indicated in the last 
step of the procedure, where we distinguish between replacements of instances of 
terms equated by S and mutual replacements of instances of s, t. This does not 
affect the soundness and completeness of the procedure; any literal which is 
-d -narrowable is also - -narrowable, for any I, r. 
x,x t,r 
procedure Solcelnequation (s, t : terms; S : System); 
G:={(p+q, identity)lp#qES]; 
while true do 
if (r r* r’, t,fr) E G such that r and r’ unify with m.g.u. p, 
then return successfully with the solving substitution $p; 
let (m + 12, a) be the oldest unnarrowed member of G; 
G := (G - {(m * Iz, a))> 
U{(p+q,a)(m *II is - -narrowed by S to p + q} 
x,x 
U{(p+q,up)lm +n is - -narrowed by the empty set to p + q using p]; 
5q, tu 
end while 
end procedure. 
Proposition 4 (Soundness). If procedure Solcelnequation (s, t, S> returns with a 
substitution t,!r, then S F s$ # t4. 
PROOF. Straightforward, by showing that S U (skoZem(slc, = t$l>] Fn,, •I . 0 
Proposition 5 (Completeness). If there exists Ic, such that S K s$ # t$, then 
Soluelnequation (s, t, S) successfully returns with some substitution. 
PROOF. Follows from the completeness of procedure Prouelitequation: since S E 
[s$ # tt,!r], S contains some inequation from which s$ # t$ can be derived by 
- -narrowing. Since any literal which is - -narrowable is also - -narrowable, 
NJ> r+ sC,tlk s, f 
Solvelnequation also terminates successfully. q 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have explored reasoning in systems of equations and inequations, 
giving special emphasis to developing a forward reasoning method for proving 
inequational consequences. We developed an inference set R, and proved its 
forward completeness. We used the completeness result to construct goal-directed 
semidecision procedures for proving and solving inequations. Proving an inequa- 
tional consequence s # t is decidable if the equations in the system together with 
skolem(s = t) meet the criteria for the decidability of T-unification. 
The expressive power of declarative languages will be enhanced if inequations 
can be stated explicitly. To develop evaluation strategies for such programming 
and specification languages, it is important to study forward reasoning techniques 
for checking inequations. We believe that the results developed above can serve as 
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a basis for developing better strategies and decision procedures for proving and 
solving inequations. For practicability and efficiency, however, our results need to 
be extended to systems containing equations specified as canonical TRS. 
In R,-proofs, unlike refutational proofs, no new equations are introduced into 
the system. Every formula m - n derived at an intermediate stage is a meaningful 
1.r 
conditional consequence of the system, unlike formulas obtained during refuta- 
tional proofs. Whenever there is an R,,-refutation proof, there is a forward proof 
tree of the same or smaller size using R,. Since there is no transitivity inference 
rule between the relations f and - , the search space-the number of minimal 
S,f 
R,-proofs of a literal from a given system-is no greater (generally less) than that 
of refutational proofs. However, in contrast with forward proof techniques, refuta- 
tional theorem-proving techniques have already been applied and implemented 
using “well-behaved” term-rewriting systems. The same must be explored for 
proofs in Rw in order to get a good comparison of the two approaches. 
Selman [29] gives an inference system which is forward complete for deducing 
every “equational implication” A ;a, = bj 2 c = d which is a consequence of a finite 
set S of equational implications. If an inequation p #q is construed to be 
equivalent to p = q 3 true = false, then this implication is deducible if it is a 
consequence of S. However, since Selman is concerned with a more general 
formalism than just equations and inequations, his inference rules are much more 
complex, and include generalized modus ponens, arbitrary introduction of an- 
tecedents, and transitivity of implication. We also observe that there is an implicit 
inequational axiom true # false, on which such an inequational proof relies. 
Our procedure for solving inequations can be of importance for constraint logic 
programming, expanding the language of allowable constraints to theories speci- 
fied by systems of equations and inequations. Our results about the structure of 
inequational proofs, establishing that any inequational consequence has a proof 
using only inequations in the given system, are also important. The significance of 
the independence of negative constraints has been pointed out in [22] for the 
design of faster and parallel algorithms for solving and checking constraints, 
especially when literals can be evaluated to a canonical form. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix contains the complete proof of Theorem 4, and the proofs of the 
lemmas needed to prove Theorem 3. It also contains the proof of Proposition 1. 
A. 1. Proof of Theorem 4 
Theorem 4 (Refutational completeness of R,). If S /= s # t, then 
S U { skolem( s = t)} t,,) 0. 
PROOF. If S F s f t, then S u Isa = ta} is unsatisfiable, where (T is a skolemizing 
substitution for s and t. Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 (below), 0 can be derived from 
S U (sa = ta} using “positive hyperresolution” and “positive hyperparamodula- 
tion” (described below for the case where each clause is a literal; see [4] for the 
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precise definition) together with the functionally reflexive axioms f(ii> =f(ii> for 
every symbol f and all terms ti. We show that every proof using these axioms and 
inference rules on equations and inequations has an equivalent proof using the 
inference rules of R,. We conclude that R, is refutationally complete because 
every inference that can be accomplished using a known refutationally complete 
strategy can also be achieved using the rules in R,. 
The functionally reflexive axioms (instances of x =x> can be obtained simply by 
invoking rule EO. In systems consisting of equations and inequations, paramodula- 
tion and resolution derive only single-literal clauses. Resolution between equations 
and inequations is just the transitivity (12) step preceding the final refutation: a 
proof of some p #p from an equation and an inequation, possibly after first 
instantiating and/or applying the symmetry rule to the literals resolved. 
In this proof, we abbreviate m[t +-s], n[t + s], m[t + rl, and n[t + rl by m[sl, 
n[ s], m[ r] and n[ r] respectively. Positive hyperparamodulation between equations 
and inequations is the inference rule 
m[t] =n[t], r=s, tu=ru 
m[s]a=n[s]a ’ 
where (+ is the m.g.u. of t and r. This has the following equivalent proof using R,: 
r=s 
(El) - 
s=r 
(E4) - 
m[s] = m[r] m[tl = n[t] r=s 
(E3) (E3) (E4) - 
m[ s]a = m[ r]a m[tla = n[tla n[r] = n[s] 
(E2)’ (E3) 
m[s]a = n[tla n[r]a = n[sla 
(ED’ 
m[sla = n[sla q 
Lemma 4.1. For an E-unsatisfiable set of clauses S, there is a proof of •I from 
S U {x =x) U F, using inference rules of positive hyperresolution and hyper- 
paramodulation, where F is the set of functionally rejkive axioms for S. 
PROOF. See [4]. 
A.2. Lemmas Used in the Proof of Theorem 3 
In the following we give a series of lemmas (along with their proofs), each of which 
essentially gives a set of transformations necessary to get an R,-proof tree into a 
desired form. These transformations were used in the proof of Theorem 3. To 
assist in reasoning about transformations of proof subtrees, we consider, besides 
R,, the inference sets R,,,, = (El, Il,E2,12,E3,13} and R,,,,, = (IO,El, Il,E2,121; 
‘(E2) is applicable because m[r]u = m[tlo and n[t]a = n[r]a. 
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proofs using these subsets of R, are referred to as conservatiue and transitive 
proofs respectively. 
Lemma 3.1 (Duality between equational and inequational proof trees). Let P be a 
conservative (or transitive) proof tree of an equation 1, = rO. Let 1, = rO,. . . , 1, = r, 
be any chain of equations from the root to a leaf of P. Let P’ be a tree obtained by 
replacing in P every equation li = ri (0 5 i I n) in the chain by the inequation li Z ri. 
Then P’ is also a conservative (or transitive) proof tree. 
PROOF. From Proposition 2.1 (the independence result for equational deduction), 
it follows that proofs of equations in R,,,,, R,,,,, do not use inequations at any 
stage. For each step in the proof tree at which li # ri is substituted for li = r,, the 
new inference remains valid: instances of El, E2, and E3 become respectively 
transformed to instances of 11, 12, and 13. Other inferences are untouched. So the 
transformed tree continues to represent a proof in R,,,, or R,,,,, respectively. 
However, the new proof uses axioms (leaves in the proof tree) from a different 
system, and derives a different theorem than the original proof. Cl 
NOTE. The above argument does not hold for the subterm inference rule (E4). 
Hence the result is not true for R,-proofs. 
Lemma 3.2. Zn the proof tree of an inequation using inference rules from R, (or Rfrans 
or R,,,,,~, if all qu me ations li # ri are replaced by the corresponding equations 
li = r,, the resulting structure continues to be a proof tree using inference rules from 
R, (or R,,,,, or R,,,,, respectively). 
PROOF. Similar to the above: applications of inference rules 11-13 are respectively 
replaced by applications of El-E3. 
Lemma 3.3. Zf A F-~,, p # q, then there is a proof of p # q (from A using R,) in which 
applications of transitivity inference rules (E2, 12) are not followed by the applica- 
tions of any other inference rules. 
PROOF. The proof of this lemma is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3.5 for 
equational derivations, and relies on applying the following transformations, fol- 
lowed by those shown for Lemma 3.5: 
(12) 
q+p,p=r q+P 
(11) 
q#r 
(El) p=r - (11) - 
+--f (12) 
r=p P+q 
r+q rfq 
7 
(12) 
q+P,P=r 
q+r 
(13) 
q+P p=r 
(E3) ~ 
(13) 
qa#pa’ pa=ra 
. 0 
qafru 
+ + (12) 
qu#ru 
Lemma 3.4. Let P be a literal at the leaf of a transitive proof tree T deriving s z s. 
Then T can be transformed to another transitive proof tree which has the same 
leaves as T, but has P as a premise in the final proof step, deriving p # p for some 
term p. 
PROOF. Consider the transitive proof tree of s # s containing one or more applica- 
tions of rules El, E2,11,12. By Proposition 2.2, there is only one inequation two 
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hops above the root; we show that this inequation can be brought down one level, 
resulting in another transitive proof tree of s # s with the same leaves. If I1 
(symmetry) was the rule applied to this inequation, then El may instead be applied 
to the equation at its “uncle” node (parent’s sibling) in the tree. If I2 (transitivity) 
was the rule applied, then E2 may instead be applied to the equations at its sibling 
and uncle nodes: 
(12) 
s#t, t=r 
s#r ’ 
r=s s#t, (E2) 
t=r,r=s 
(12) + + (12) 
t=s 
sfs sfs 
t+s t=s 
(11) - 
Sft’ 
t=s 
(12) 
sfs 
--) + (12) 
t+s, (El) s=t 
t#t 
By repeating these tree transformations, a leaf inequation can be brought down 
until it is just above the root in the transitive proof tree. By Lemma 3.2, similar 
transformations can be applied for lowering equations, i.e., a leaf equation in a 
transitive proof of s # s can be lowered until it is a child of the root. q 
Lemma 3.5. The R,-proof tree r of any equation can be transformed into another 
R,,-proof tree r’, in which applications of transivity (E2) are not followed by the 
applications of any other inference rule. 
PROOF. By Proposition 2, r contains only applications of rules EO-E4. EO can be 
applied only at the leaves of a tree, and can hence be ignored. We repeatedly 
transform T, pulling down the applications of E2 towards the final result and away 
from the leaves. After repeating these transformations as often as possible, we 
obtain the desired proof tree with a transitive proof subtree containing the root; 
only the part of the proof tree closest to the conclusion contains applications of 
transitivity (E2): 
WI 
4=P>P=r 
(El) 
(El) 
q=r 
r=q 
--t+ (E2) 
5. (El) = 
P=q 
r=q 
(E2) 
q=P>P=’ Y=P 
(E3) ___ 
p=r 
(E3) ~ 
(E3) 
q=r 
+ + (E2) 
qu=pa’ pcr=ro 
q(T=tYr qa=r(T 
(E4) 
s,=t ,,..., (E2) “’ .1’,, ” ,..., s,,=t,, 
--)+ f(s I,...,. Tk ,..., s,,)=f(t I,..., fk ,..., t,,) 
s, =t 
CEO) ~ 
,,....Sk=r s =t 7”.1,1 n ~. f, =t, ““’ 
r=tk,..., (EO) t 
n n 
(El) 
CE4) f(j,> =f(t I)...) r ,.__, t,), CE4) f(t I,..., r ,...> t,)=f(f,) 
f(s I,..., Sk ,..., s,)=f(t ,I..., lk ,..., f,,) 
q 
A.3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Proposition I. The proof tree of any equation can be transfomzed into another proof 
tree in which applications of transitivity (E2) are not followed by those of any other 
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inference rule, and applications of the super-tern rule (E4) are followed only by 
transitivity (E2). 
PROOF. In addition to the transformations shown in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we 
also apply the following transformations to pull down applications of (E4) towards 
the root of the proof tree: 
(E4) 
(El) 
(E4) 
053) 
sl=tl,...,sn=tn sl=tl,..., sn=tn 
(El)-,..., 
f(sl . . . sn> = f(t1.. . tn) ++ t1 = sl tn = sn 
(E4) 
f(t1 . . . tnl = f(sl . . . sn> 
sl=tl,...,sn=tn 
053) 
f(s1.. . sn) = f(t1.. . tn) ++ 
(E4) 
f(slff . . . sncs) = f(tla.. . tna) 
f(t1 . tn) = f(s1 . . sn) 
sl = t1 sn = tn 
,.,., 
sla = t1a snv = tnu 
f(sla . sncs) = f(tla.. . tnu) 
0 
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REPRESENTING KNOWLEDGE 
WITH THEORIES ABOUT THEORIES 
EDWARD P. STABLER, JR. 
D Theories about proofs in other theories can be used not only to provide 
representations of completed proofs, but also to provide an elegant, 
declarative, and logically pure method for controlling deductions. This 
idea is used implicitly in a widening range of applications, and deserves 
explicit consideration. In this paper, a technique for generating a standard 
proof-representation-building metatheory for Horn-clause theories de- 
fined, its logical semantics is carefully considered, and the sense in which 
the technique is correct and complete is defined. Then we show how such 
metatheories can elegantly represent a wide range of problems. We focus 
on some problems which are naturally formulated in terms of overly 
general axioms together with conditions on proofs which block exactly the 
derivations of incorrect results: diagnosis, planning, and natural-language 
parsing. This surprising approach can yield representations that are suc- 
cinct, feasible, and close to the most intuitive, informal statement of the 
problem. Methods for using such an approach efficiently with left-to-right 
theorem provers are described. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Theories about sentences or 
theories of knowledge, belief, 
proofs in another theory are often useful. Some 
and action, for example, use representations of the 
sentences believed by an agent [20]. In the most straightforward logical approaches 
to parsing, the output is a proof tree [24]. In other applications, a proof tree is 
taken as input to further processing. For example, a representation of a proof is 
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sometimes displayed as a justification of proven results, or it is used by programs 
that aid in detecting errors in the axioms of the object theory [31]. The focus of this 
paper, though, will be on applications that use restrictive conditions on proofs: 
conditions that are not satisfied by any proof of certain provable entailments of the 
object theory, These conditions, we will say, “sacrifice the completeness” of the 
proof method of the object theory. Our approach to defining conditions on proofs 
differs from many others in that these conditions are defined in first-order logic as 
relations over provably correct representations of first-order resolution proofs. The 
advantages of using a declarative, first-order logical representation, with its well- 
understood semantics and proof techniques, can thus be carried over to the 
metatheoretic level. 
The most common application of conditions on proof trees is in controlling the 
search for a refutation by pruning the derivation tree being searched. This 
technique is to be distinguished from other “metalevel” strategies that only control 
the order in which the tree is searched. Some of the former, pruning techniques 
are well known. For example, some proofs can be eliminated from a resolution 
search space without affecting the completeness of the proof procedure. One of 
the best-known strategies of this sort is the elimination of “repetitive” derivations, 
i.e., derivations in which a clause identical to one of its ancestors is derived by 
input resolution [17, 29, 61. 
In other systems, the search for a proof is controlled in ways that may sacrifice 
completeness, although that is not their goal. For example, heuristic techniques, 
the imposition of bounds on the depth or breadth of a proof, and interactive 
theorem provers may restrict the search for a proof in ways that sacrifice complete- 
ness, but their goal is just to avoid unnecessary search. There is a third class of 
applications for restrictions on proofs, though, which are naturally expressed in 
terms of axioms together with conditions on the proofs that deliberately sacrifice 
completeness. In these cases, the set of refutations from the axioms is a superset of 
the set of desired, “correct” refutations. Strictly speaking, under the usual inter- 
pretation, the axioms are overly general, but the incorrect entailments are never 
proven because conditions on the proofs block the proof of exactly those results. 
Another way to look at the matter is to view the basic axioms as correct 
characterizations of the set of possible solutions, where the correct solutions are 
then characterized as possible solutions whose proofs in the original theory have 
special properties. A simple logical foundation and applications of this approach 
will be the focus of this paper. 
This basic idea was pioneered by Chomsky [8] in his use of multiple levels of 
representation in the description of natural languages: a basic theory (a generative 
grammar) characterizes a class of strings, and then a second level of principles 
applies to the proofs that those strings follow from the basic theory (i.e. to 
derivations from the “base” grammar). This sort of strategy is still discernible in 
the most recent efforts in Chomskian syntax. A similar problem representation 
seems to be valuable in other domains as well.’ The application of a metatheoretic 
‘Although it was parsing techniques inspired by Chomskian syntax that inspired this work, the 
connection between the problem representations described here and Chomsky’s theories of language is 
rather loose. Chomsky defined transformations on the “base” trees and principles that must be satisfied 
by the outputs of these transformations. The well-formedness conditions on the outputs of the 
transformations, then, only indirectly restrict the set of “base” trees that can correspond to good 
sentences. 
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representational strategy to parsing with Chomskian concepts is only one of the 
natural applications of metatheoretic strategies. 
We focus on Horn-clause problems because they allow such simple proof 
techniques and fast implementations. The extension of the approach to full 
first-order logic, though, is straightforward. In this paper, we consider some 
problems that are naturally expressed in terms of Horn-clause axioms together 
with constraints on proofs, and then we elaborate our metatheoretic approach to 
obtain correct representations that are more feasibly managed by left-to-right 
Horn-clause refutation systems like PROLOG, SLD resolution with a leftmost 
selection rule [16], or Earley deduction. ’ Finally, we will contrast our approach 
with related work and consider directions for further research. 
2. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
To constrain derivations we must first have terms to represent them. There are 
standard techniques for defining proof trees of a theory. We will begin with one of 
the simplest techniques. We transform a theory S into a theory Tag that specifies 
derivation trees in S. 
In the presentation of his incompleteness theorem, Giidel formalized deriva- 
tions by assigning natural numbers to the primitive symbols, thus representing 
formulas by finite sequences of natural numbers and proofs by finite sequences of 
finite sequences of natural numbers [12]. It is illuminating to note some of the 
respects in which the present approach differs from Giidel’s. In the first place, we 
wiil not use a system in which a proof or any other expression can contain a term 
that, under the intended interpretation, refers to an expression properly containing 
it. Thus no predication can assert anything about itself. Under our intended 
interpretation, terms of TJS) have exactly the same length and the same structure 
as the terms of S that they refer to: the interpretation of these terms is given by a 
symbol for symbol bijection. This makes the semantics and the proofs in the 
metatheoty rJSI extremely simple. But it is clear that this same property makes 
self-referential formulas impossible in a standard logic, for notice that we immedi- 
ately have the consequence that no finite expression can properly contain a name 
of itself. A second difference between our approach and standard Giidel number- 
ing in arithmetic is that we do not need to define a representation of proofs in S in 
the language of S itself; rather, it is convenient to allow the language of T”(S) to 
be a simple transformation of the language of S. These differences allow us to use 
an approach that is more concise and more efficient than the one Giidel needed. 
One final difference of less importance is that we represent proofs with trees 
rather than with sequences: trees provide useful information about the structure of 
the proof. 
We will first define a syntactic transformation ra that maps a theory S into a 
different theory TJSI, which specifies the proof trees of S. We then specify the 
intended semantic interpretation of the output of this transformation, the range of 
T”. And finally we establish some of the important properties of To. 
‘Earley deduction, an “all paths at once” resolution strategy inspired by Earley’s context-free 
parsing algorithm, is described in [25]. 
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2.1. The Syntactic Transfomzation 
We begin by motivating our approach with a simple example. The function TV 
transforms a logical theory expressed in Horn clauses into another theory which 
defines derivations in the original theory. The basic idea of the transformation is 
really quite simple and well known: the proof is represented by a variable added as 
a new argument o every predicate in the body of a clause, and by a term added as 
argument to every predicate in the head of a clause, as illustrated in the following 
example: 3 
s= { +mun(x), 
man(x) +male(x),humun(x), 
male(x) + ) 
human(x) + )) 
T(S) = { +man(x,Proof), 
man(x, ~4X>/[Q, RI) +mule(x,Q),human(x,R), 
male(x,male(x)) + , 
humun( x, human(x)) +- ] . 
Notice that one instance of + mun(x, Proof) that is inconsistent with the other 
clauses in T&S) is one in which x remains uninstantiated and Proof is instantiated 
to the term mun(x)/[mule(x>,humun(x)]. Letting the slash represent the domi- 
nance relation and putting the subtrees under a node in a list, this term represents 
the tree with a root labeled man(x) dominating two leaves labeled mule(x) and 
human(x), respectively, as shown in Figure 1. We interpret this as a proof tree 
indicating that, in S, Vmun(x) can be proven by proving Vmulek) and Vhumun(x), 
which in turn can be proven directly from unit clauses. We now explain these 
matters in detail, beginning with the syntax. 
Consider our previous example. Notice that language of r,,(S) is not the same as 
the language of S: it includes new predicates, and a number of new function 
symbols: the unary function symbols mun, mule, and human, the binary (infix) 
function /, and the list functions (which are, in canonical form, . and [I). We will 
define the language L’ of r,JS) in terms of L as follows. 
Let L be the language of an arbitrary theory S. Define a bijection name from 
the n-ary (n 2 0) predicate symbols of L onto a set of n-ary function symbols that 
do not occur in L. Then the the set of function symbols of L’ is the union of the 
3We follow the terminology and notation of [16], except that we will use not only ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, . as 
names of variables, but any symbol beginning with an uppercase letter or underscore, as is done in 
many PROLOGs. 
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man(x) 
male(x) human(x) FIGURE 1. A simple proof tree. 
function symbols of L with the set F of new n-ary function symbols, 
F = {f”lf” = name( P”) for some predicate P” in L}, 
together with a set T containing three new function symbols (whose arity we have 
indicated with superscripts): 
T= {.‘,[I”>/‘}. 
The first two symbols in T are the standard binary “list constructor” and the 0-ary 
“empty list;” if these functors already occur in S, different symbols can be used to 
avoid ambiguity. To simplify the presentation, we assume that the symbols in T do 
not occur in L or F. And we assume that L does not use any symbol as an n-ary 
function symbol and as an n-ary predicate symbol, so name can be a syntactic 
identity function. As is standard, we adopt the notational convention of using the 
more readable bracket notation for lists (e.g., [a,[b]]) as an abbreviation for the 
canonical functional notation (.(a, .(.(b, [ I), [ I>) or infix notation a.((b.[ ]>.[ 1)). 
The set of predicate symbols of L’ is the sei (again using superscripts to indicate 
arity) 
(P”“1 P” a predicate in L}. 
Definition of rO. 
6) For any set S of Horn clauses, 7&S) = (7&C)IC E S}. 
(ii) For any Horn clause C such that for some k > 0 
c= *AI,...,&, 
we define 
70(C) = CA\,...,Ab, 
where if the predicate of Ai is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), then A; is the 
K+ I-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, as its fist arguments and 
with a new variable as its last argument. 
(iii) For any Horn clause C such that 
C=A,+, 
we define 
70(C) =/lb + ) 
where the predicate of A, is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), and the 
predicate of A6 is the n + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, 
as its first arguments and with (the function expression that is syntactically 
identical to) A, itself as its last argument. 
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(iv) For any Horn clause C such that for some k > 0 
C=Ao+A,,...,Ak, 
we define 
where 
(a) if the predicate of Ai (k 2 i 2 1) is an n-ary predicate P (n L 01, then 
A; is the n + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of Ai as its first 
arguments and with a new variable as its last argument, and 
(b) if the predicate of A, is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), then Ah is the 
12 + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, as its first arguments 
and with A,/[ VI,. . . , Vkl as its last argument, where V,, . . . , V, are the 
k new variables introduced by step (a). 
Notice that according to this definition, TV is not really functional, since the 
choice of “new variables” is not determined by the source clause. However, it is 
clear that all the values of TJC) for any C are variants of one another: since we 
are interested in the entailments of the values of r&0, any one of these values 
will suffice. 
One other point that should be noted is that T,, introduces some redundancy: 
the representation of the proof repeats information that is specified in other 
arguments of the predicates. Obviously, we could eliminate some of this redun- 
dancy in various ways. The reason for keeping the redundancy in ~a is, intuitively, 
just that it keeps the “tree-building” part of the theory separate from the 
arguments needed to define the entailments. As a result, this formulation is slightly 
more convenient in the proof of the “noninterference” property of TV, defined 
below. This formulation also facilitates the consideration of sound ways of building 
something less, or something rather different, than complete proof trees, as 
discussed in the section below on efficient representations. 
2.2. An Appropriate Semantic Interpretation of the Transformed Theory 
As noted above, transformations like TV are really very common in logic program- 
ming, but they are often introduced as proof-theoretic tricks, with little semantic 
explanation. The basic idea we will use has been well explained, though, as in the 
following passage by Moore: 
Typically this sort of thing is done using string operations like concatenation, so that the 
conjunction of P and Q would be represented by something like ‘(‘/PI‘ A ‘IQl‘Y. . . . There is 
a much more elegant way to do the encoding, however, which is due to McCarthy (1962) 
[19]. For purposes of semantic interpretation of the object language, which is what we want 
to do, the details of the syntax are largely irrelevant. In particular, the only thing that we 
need to know about the syntax of conjunctions is that there is some way of taking P and Q 
and producing the conjunction of P and Q. We can represent this by having a function And 
such that And(P, Q> denotes the conjunction of P and Q. To use McCarthy’s term, 
And(P,Q) is an abstract syntax for representing the conjunction of P and Q. We will 
represent all the logical operators of the object language by functions in an abstract syntax. 
DO, p. 791 
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The basic strategy here really dates back at least to Tarski (1934) 1351, who used 
exactly this approach in his work on truth definitions. As we noted above, Godel’s 
(1931) formal representation in PM of syntactic expressions of PM was necessarily 
more complex, but embodies the same sort of idea. The same approach is used in 
most modern presentations of formal logic. Applying this idea to our problem, we 
take rO(S) to be a theory about the formal properties of S. Instead of representing 
such things as conjunctions of propositional-calculus atoms, we will represent 
proof trees of (universally closed) predicate-calculus atoms. This raises some minor 
technical difficulties, to which we now turn. 
We have particular interest in the proof trees corresponding to refutations in S. 
An ordered tree is standardly specified by a pair (A, R) where A is a set of 
vertices and R is a set of sequences of edges (where the edges are ordered pairs of 
vertices). A labeling then associates a label with each vertex in the tree. We will 
use a slightly different specification of a labeled tree. A labeled tree will be 
specified with either a label by itself or a term of the form L/S where L is a label 
and S is the sequence [t,, . . . , t,] of trees immediately dominated by L. So a label 
is a tree consisting of just a root node with no arcs. In a tree E/[t,, . . . , t,], I is the 
label of the root vertex, r,, . . . , t, (n 2 0) are trees, and an arc connects the root 
labeled 1 to the root of each ti (0 < i I n), in order. 
Definition. The set of proof trees over L is the set of trees with nodes labeled with 
atoms of L. We will regard these atoms as implicitly universally closed. 
Definition. Let G be a goal +-A where A is an atom. Let q be an SLD refutation 
(G,, G,, . . . , G,,) (G, = G, G, = 01 using input clauses C,, . . . , C, with unifiers 
8 i, . . . , On, whose composition we will call 8. Then a proof tree corresponding to 
Y is a proof tree such that in 9, Gi_ i (0 < i I n> is resolved with the head of 
input clause C, = C + C,,, . . . , Cim (m 2 0) iff there is a node in the tree labeled 
C0 with m daughters labeled C,,B,. . . , Ci_8. Again, we regard the literals that 
label the tree as universally closed. 
This is a standard notion of a proof tree (e.g., [32]). It is easy to show that for 
any SLD refutation V of a theory, there is exactly one proof tree corresponding to 
q. Given any particular proof tree F and a computation rule R, there is a theory 
with at least one SLD refutation via R that corresponds to F. 
We can now define an interpretation I’ with domain D’ in terms of our original 
theory S, its language L, and its interpretation I. The only tricky part is clause c3>, 
because we need to have variables of the object language L in the domain D’ of 
our theory. We regard these variables, which range over D, as universally quanti- 
tied: 
(1) 
(2) 
The domain. D’ is the well-formed expressions of L together with the 
proof trees over L and sequences of proof trees over L. 
The interpretation of the function symbols. All function symbols except those 
in 
T= {.“,[I”,/‘} 
receive the Herbrand interpretation. That is, 0-ary functions are mapped 
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into themselves, and each n-ary (n > 0) function f is associated with the 
mapping from t,, . . . , t, to the function expression f(tr, . . . , t,). The function 
symbols in T provide representations of (labeled, ordered) trees with more 
than 0 arcs, as mentioned above. I’ associates / with the mapping from l/s 
to the tree with a root labeled 1 immediately dominating the subtrees in the 
sequence s. (We let Z/s denote the empty sequence whenever s is not itself 
a sequence.) I’ associates . and [] with the standard mappings to sequences: 
i 
(h,t 
I’(h.t) = (>> 
I,...,L) iftisasequence(t,,...,t,)(n20), 
otherwise, 
NI) = 0. 
(3) The interpretation of the predicate symbols. Following standard practice, 
expressions 4 of L containing free variables are interpreted relative to an 
assignment 5 of variables of L to elements of D: Z(4), is then defined for 
all expressions in L. We accordingly define I’ in terms of Z and assignments 
5. Every n-ary predicate symbol p” is assigned a set of n-tuples in D’ as 
follows: 
(a,,..., a,> EZ’( P”> 
iff 
for every 5, (Z(ai)*,..., Z(a,-i>*) +P”-‘), 
and a, is a proof tree corresponding to a refutation of +p(a,, . . . , a,,_ 1) 
in S. 
2.3. Motivating the Interpretation I’ 
At this point it would be nice to prove that Z E S iff I’ k TJS), but unfortunately, 
this does not hold. Consider the previous example of Section 2.1. It is clear that 
I’ l# humanC[ I, human([ I>) +- , and so I’ # human(x, human(x)) + , and yet this is a 
clause in 7JS). In short, under our intended interpretation, our transformed 
theories are false. 
We could consider looking for a different interpretation I” with the property 
that Z I= S iff Z” k ~~(9, but this is obviousIy not very appealing. We do not want 
an interpretation that verifies human([ 1, human([ 1)) +- . The most straightforward 
interpretations I” with the property Z b S iff I” b rO(S) are just not natural. 
A more appealing strategy is to define a different transformation 7 with the 
property that Z + S iff Z’ b 49. The noted problem with I’ arises because the 
domain we quanti’fy over includes not only the terms of L but also the predications 
of L and proofs in S that contain such predications. Suppose we formally define a 
new unary predicate term, so that it is satisfied by all and only terms of L. Then 
we could easily define a natural +r(S) that includes the axioms of this definition and 
adds a condition to every definite clause in the range of r,, requirmg that the terms 
in all but the last arguments of the predicates of that clause ,be terms of L. Then 
we would have Z b S iff I’ b r(S). However, these transformed theories r(S) are 
more complex than 7&Q. Not only does r(S) have more symbols than r,_,(S), but 
many proofs in ~6.9 would be considerably more complex. Notice that fenn, will 
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have the infinitely many terms of L in its extension: a proper axiomatization would 
need to make available names for the infinitely many variables of L, and the 
names of the function expressions will also be infinite if L contains even a single 
function symbol with positive arity. Consequently, finding a desired instance of a 
proof using elements of the extension of term, can be computationally trouble- 
some. 
Given the complexity of r(S), it is interesting to note the surprising fact that the 
property that I’ # rO(S) does not really matter for our practical purposes. In the 
first place, it is common for logic programmers to neglect conditions that will 
properly restrict the provable instances of a goal. Consider for example the 
standard definition of the append relation: 
When these clauses are added to any theory whose intended domain includes 
anything other than lists, the first clause is false under the standard interpretation 
of append. These consequences could be ruled out by adding a condition requiring 
that the arguments of append all be lists, but for most purposes this is unnecessary. 
The same is true for the result of applying ra. We should just keep in mind that 
T,$S> is only an approximation to the correct theory: we must be careful to 
properly restrict the instances of provable goals. The danger is just that when a 
logic program contains many such approximations, the programmer may forget the 
limitations of his axiomatization and get unsound results. 
For this reason, it worth noting that we can prove that ~a will behave properly 
on the range of practical cases that we are interested in. Notice that the problem- 
atic case human([ I, human([ ]>I +- is not in the range of ra, since human([ I> is not 
an expression in the language L of S-it contains the constant [I, which is in L’ 
but not in L. If we restrict our attention to refutations of goals that are in the 
range of me, we will never get an unsound result. So given a theory S and goal G, 
we do have a sound and efficient method for getting representations of proofs of G 
in S. The relevant results are the following (the proofs are in Appendix 1): 
Proposition 1 (Noninterference). There is an n-step SLD refutation of S U {GJ using 
input clauses C,, . . , , C,, and correct answer substitution E iff for some substitu- 
tion 77 for variables that do not occur in G, there is an n-step SLDa refutation of 
TJS) U {-ro(G)} using clauses 7JC,), . . . , TV with correct answer substitu- 
tion 7. 
Corollary 1 (Noninterference). S k VC iff, for some substitution q for variables that 
do not occur in C, T,@) k VT~(C)Q. 
Proposition 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = +-A, where A is atomic. There is 
an n-step SLD refutation of T,,(S) U (T,&G)} with a computed answer substitution 77 
@ 77 is a substitution {Proof/Tree) such that Proof is the variable introduced into 
r,JG) by T,,, and Tree is a derivation tree corresponding to an SLD refutation of 
(G) u S. 
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Corollary 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = + A, where A is atomic, and let 
rO(G) = + A’. Then rO(S) k VA’77 iff q, when restricted to variables in A’, is a 
substitution (Proof/Tree) such that Proof is the variable introduced into A’ by rO, 
and Tree is a derivation tree corresponding to a refutation of {G) U S. 
We conclude this section by considering again the example with which this 
section began to see that the interpretation we have provided is indeed very close 
to what was promised. When we prove that 
+ man( x, man( x)/[ maZe(x),human(x)]) 
is -inconsistent with ra(S), we can conclude that 
Vman(x,man(x)/[male(x),human(x)]) 
is entailed by the theory. Keeping in mind that the values of the variable in this 
term should really be restricted to the terms of the language of S, we have the 
result that when x is assigned any term in the language of S, 
man(x)/[male(x), human(x)] is a proof in S. In particular, then, if x1_, y,, . . . 
are variables of the object theory, we can conclude that man(x,)/ 
[male(x,), human( is a proof in S. That is, Vman(x,>) can be proven in the 
object theory by proving VmaZe(x,) and Vhuman(x,), which in turn can be proven 
directly from unit clauses. This is the interpretation we wanted. 
2.4. A Horn-Clause Provability Predicate 
A simple extension of our metatheoretic framework will suffice to define a basic 
“metainterpreter”, or object-language provability predicate, for definite-clause 
theories. Such predicates are used quite frequently [32, 41, and we will want to 
make use of one when we consider more efficient representations of our problems, 
below. 
We will use the same metatheoretic strategy to define a provability predicate 
that was used to define proof trees labeled with literals of the object theory. In this 
case, to represent theories we use sequences whose elements are clauses of the 
object theory. Introducing the comma as a binary infix functor and the left arrow as 
a unary postfix and binary infix function symbol, we can represent a sequence of 
ground clauses, as in 
[ ( man ( Socrates) t male( Socrates), human( Socrates)), 
(male( Socrates) + ) , 
( human ( Socrates) + ) ] . 
Representing a clause with variables is not possible in our system, since we have 
not provided names for any of the variables. It is not difficult to introduce variable 
names and explicit quantifiers as in [20], but avoiding names of object-language 
variables allows us to use simpler metatheories that also have real practical 
advantages: We can avoid computationally expensive substitute and unify predi- 
cates for object-language expressions. Consequently, rather than representing an 
object-theory clause with variables, we will use metatheoretic quantification to 
make claims about all of the instances of certain expressions. So, for example, a 
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nonground term like the following, occurring in a metatheoretic clause, will have 
its metatheoretic variables bound in the usual way, and these variables can range 
over a domain that includes all of the terms-including the variables-of the 
object theory: 
[(man(x) +mafe(x),human(x)), 
(male( socrates) +),(humun(socrutes) +)I. 
It is clear that this can properly capture the significance of the object theory’s 
variables.4 
With this representation of definite-clause theories, we can use the following 
elegant axiomatization of provability: 
demo(Theory,(P,Q)) +demo(Theoly,P),demo(Theory,Q) 
demo ( Theory, P ) +member((P+),Theoly) 
demo ( Theory , P) +member((P+Q),Theoly),demo(Theory,Q) 
These axioms say, roughly, that a conjunction is provable (or demonstrable) from 
the theory represented by the first argument if both conjuncts are; a literal P is 
provable if P + is an instance of a unit clause in the theory; and P is also 
provable if there is a clause in the theory of the form PO + Q, where there is a 
substitution 19 such that PO8 = PO and Q,O is provable. 
Notice that the axioms defining demo have the same flaw as the output of TV 
and the standard axiomatization of append. Strictly speaking, we should require 
that variables occurring in terms like 
[(man(x) +mule(x),humun(x)), 
(mule( Socrates) + ) , ( humun( Socrates) + )] 
range only over object-theory terms. However, we will never be testing any other 
instances, and so the simple formulation will do for practical purposes. A strictly 
correct formulation would simply be one in which we add to each of the three 
axioms the condition that (every instance of) Theory is a sequence of object-theory 
clauses, that Q is a conjunction of one or more positive object theory literals, and 
that P is a positive object-theory literal. 
3. APPLICATIONS 
As noted above, there are many applications for theories that produce representa- 
tions of completed proofs: parsing, justification facilities, and debuggers. We focus 
on applications with restrictive conditions over the proof representations: condi- 
tions that do not preserve the completeness of the proof procedure. We focus in 
particular on problems that are naturally formulated in terms of overly general 
axioms together with conditions on proofs which block exactly the derivations of 
4Nothing very important turns on this decision to avoid variable names. We choose this strategy 
simply for reasons of expository convenience and efficiency. Note that this strategy does not allow us to 
treat nonground theories as “first-class objects”, and it does not allow us to provide a logical 
foundations for PROLOG’s assert and retract predicates with variables, as pointed out in [S]. 
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incorrect results. To illustrate the range and power of this approach, we will briefly 
consider three rather different types of problems that are naturally expressed in 
this way. We consider basic formulations of these problems before considering 
more efficient representations in later sections. 
3.1. Diagnosis 
One recent approach to diagnosis involves finding an inconsistency between the 
observed behavior of a system and the behavior that follows from a logical 
specification of its design. Once such an inconsistency is detected, Reiter 1271 has 
shown how we can diagnose the problem by examining the proofs of inconsistency. 
A diagnosis is a minimal set of assumptions whose removal restores consistency. 
The procedure Reiter defines for computing diagnoses makes use of a relation tp 
that can be regarded as a constraint on proofs in a basic theory of the operation of 
the system being diagnosed. The relation tp is satisfied by inconsistency proofs that 
do not use certain axioms of the specification of the design and behavior of the 
system. In this sense, the object-level axioms are overly general in that they define 
a set of inconsistency proofs, only some of which-those satisfying particular 
instances of predications involving tp-are of interest. Let’s consider this in a little 
more detail. 
Since Reiter does not present a Horn-clause formulation, we will adapt one of 
his examples and show one way of defining his function tp as a metatheoretical 
relation. Consider the circuit shown in Figure 2. The operation of the basic logic 
gates is easily axiomatized. For each type of gate that might have a fault, we can 
introduce explicitly a check on the assumption that the gate is operating normally, 
by conditioning our axioms about the gates as illustrated below: 
output( Gate, 0) + and_gate( Gate), inputl( Gate, 0)) not_abnormal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 0) + and_gate( Gate), input2( Gate, 0)) not_abnomal( Gate) 
output( Gate, 1) +- and_gate( Gate), inputl( Gate, 1)) input2( Gate, 1)) 
not_abnomal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 1) +- or_gate( Gate), input 1( Gate, 1)) not_abnomal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 1) + or_gute( Gate), input2( Gate, 1), not_abnormal(Gate) 
output ( Gate, 0) + or_gate( Gate), input 1( Gate, 0)) input 2( Gate, 0) , 
not_abnomal( Gate) 
out‘t( Gate, Out) t 
xor_gute ( Gate), 
inputl( Gate, Znl), input2( Gate, Zn2), xor( Znl, Zn2, Out), 
rwt_abnomal(Gate) 
xor( 1, 1,0) +- xor(l,O, 1) 4- xor(O,l, 1) + xor(O,O, 0) + 
disjoint(0, 1) 6 disjoint ( 1,O) + 
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I / 
FIGURE 2. A full adder. 
To specify the design of the particular circuit we must specify 
circuit: 
and_gure( al) + and-gate ( a 2) + xor_gafe ( xl) + 
xor_gate ( x 2) +- or_gufe( 01) + 
the gates of the 
We add our assumptions that these gates are operating normally: 
not_abnoR?zaf( al) + not_abnormal( a2) + not_abnomd( xl) +- 
not_abnomal( x 2) +- not_abnomal( 01) + 
And finally we must specify how the gates are connected in such a way that every 
needed value can be determined from the specified inputs to the circuit. For this 
purpose the following conditionals suffice (although the corresponding bicondition- 
als would of course be true): 
inputl( x2, Value) + output (xl, V&e) 
input2( x2, Vdue) + inputl( a2, V&e) 
input 2( a2, Value) +- output( xl, Value) 
inputl( al, Value) + inputl( xl, Value) 
input 2( al, Vulue) * input2( xl, V&e) 
inputl( 01, Value) + output (a 2, Value) 
input 2( 01, V&e) +- output (al, Ifdue) 
Observed behavior then can be represented with axioms like the following: 
inputl( xl, 1) + input2( x1,0) + inputl( a2,l) + 
output( x2,1) + output(ol,0) + 
This is a complete, basic theory of the operation of our faulty circuit. 
Given a theory like this, we want to check for an inconsistency between the 
observed output and the output that the design specification determines. This can 
be done by adding the Horn-clause expression of the fact that no output gate can 
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have two values X, Y that are disjoint-a “goal”: 
+- output( Gate, X), disjoint( X,Y), output( Gate, Y) 
If we can refute this negative clause (showing the inconsistency of the theory 
comprising this clause together with the other axioms), then we know the circuit is 
faulty. For convenience, we will use the equivalent strategy of adding the following 
clauses and proving the inconsistency of the result: 
inconsistency + output( Gate, X), disjoint( X, Y), output( Gate, Y) 
+ inconsistency 
This alternative strategy, using a negative unit clause, will allow our metatheoretic 
transformation to give us a single proof tree to inspect-a proof tree with 
inconsistency at the root. 
Since the questionable assumptions of the theory have been marked as assump- 
tions that the components are not_abnormal, Reiter defines a diagnosis to be a 
minimal set C of components such that removing not_abnonnal(Component) for 
every Component in C restores consistency. In this example, there are three 
diagnoses: [xl], [x2, a21, [x2,011. These diagnoses can be determined by examin- 
ing the proofs of inconsistency to see which not_abnormal assumptions about the 
circuit were used. This is exactly what r0 allows us to do. Applying TV to the 
axioms presented above, we produce a new l-place predicate again named incon- 
sistency with the property that the provable instances of inconsistency(Proof) are 
exactly those in which Proof is instantiated to a proof of inconsistency in the 
original theory. This transformed theory can then be embedded in a larger 
metatheory which defines special properties that we want these proofs to have. 
Since the questionable assumptions of the theory have been marked as assump- 
tions that the components are not_abnonnal, we can examine our proofs to find 
which components’ operations were assumed to be normal. We simply check the 
proof tree for nodes labeled not_abnormal(Component). The set of components 
named in these nodes in a particular proof is what Reiter calls a conflict set. One 
way to compute the diagnoses involves finding every conflict set by finding every 
proof of inconsistency, and then computing the possible diagnoses from the set of 
conflict sets. Clearly this approach is not feasible if there is a very large or infinite 
set of inconsistency proofs, or if the proofs are very complex. 
Reiter defines a much more efficient way of computing a diagnosis, though, 
which does not, in general, require finding all proofs of inconsistency. This 
procedure uses a procedure tp which searches for inconsistency proofs in which 
various not_abnormal assumptions are not used, and returns a conflict set of a 
proof if one is found. Roughly, the idea is to find one conflict set and then 
efficiently pare it down to a minimal conflict set by calling tp to see if there are 
inconsistency proofs using only some proper subsets of the conflict sets already 
found. (See Reiter [271 for the details of this “paring-down” algorithm.) Notice 
that tp is exactly the sort of relation that is easily represented with our metatheo- 
retie approach. We can define tp as a two-place relation between a list of 
components and a conflict set for a proof, where the proof is one that does not use 
assumptions about the components listed in the first argument.5 If there is no 
proof that does not make assumptions about the components listed in the first 
argument to this predicate, the second argument is defined to be the special 
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expression consistency. The following axioms suffice: 
tp ( Components, ConflictSet ) + 
inconsistency ( Proof), 
7 uses_components( Components, Proof), 
conflict_set ( Proof, ConflictSet ) 
tp( Components, consistency) c- 
7 ( inconsistency ( Proof), 
7 uses_components( Components, Proof) ) 
This axiomatization of tp is correct, but notice that it is inefficient for left-to-right 
theorem provers: it finds a complete Proof before checking to make sure that the 
Proof does not use any of the components named in the list Components. This 
inefficient generate-and-test solution procedure can be transformed with the 
techniques described below to yield a provably correct theory from which diag- 
noses can be established using a minimal number of constrained proofs. 
The “paring-down” procedure Reiter defines to call tp in the computation of 
diagnoses is also easily represented in Horn clauses, and can simply be added to 
the metatheory (though this is not relevant to the present material, and so will be 
left to the reader). Appropriate instances of tp can also be used to efficiently find 
diagnoses that assume less than n faults. The flexibility of our metatheoretical 
approach makes other elaborations of Reiter’s basic approach straightforward. For 
example, in some types of systems, there may be pairs of components which very 
rarely fail together. In such cases, it would be easy to tailor the search to find any 
diagnoses that remain without the assumption that both members of any such pair 
have failed. 
3.2. Planning 
Planning problems can be expressed in terms of an appropriate relation between a 
plan and a goal such that performing the plan will achieve the goal. In some 
formulations of planning problems, the plan itself is closely related to a proof. 
D. H. D. Warren noted this point in discussing WARPLAN, for example: “. . . there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between plans and the proofs that these plans 
achieve the desired goals. . . . Thus the terms representing plans can equally well 
be said to represent proofs of these plans. . . . ” [381. On this approach, actions are 
expressed by rules, so that an action is a way of making certain propositions true. 
In a recent similar project, Bibel has also used this correspondence between 
proofs and plans to provide an explicit formulation of planning as a problem of 
finding a proof satisfying certain constraints [I]. He shows that “connection 
sRather than blocking the use of certain assumptions, Reiter gives a theorem prover sets of clauses 
from which those assumptions are absent. This requires that the system that calls the theorem prover 
have a (metatheoretic) way of naming the clauses used by the theorem prover. We have introduced such 
an extension of our framework in defining the demo predicate, but the simple approach described here 
does not require that extension. 
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proofs” meeting certain constraints correspond to plans. Recasting Bibel’s con- 
straints in a way appropriate for resolution proofs in Horn-clause theories is not 
trivial.6 Bibel adopts the simplifying assumption that every proposition whose truth 
is affected by an action is listed in the antecedent of the action rule. Then his 
constraint is roughly that, in a forward chaining system, the axioms used to 
establish the preconditions of an action should not be assumed to hold later in the 
proof, “after the action”.’ 
A simple example will illustrate the correspondence between plans and proofs 
meeting certain constraints. It will also illustrate some minor difficulties with 
representing planning problems in a Horn-clause resolution system. Consider a 
simple “blocks world” example with blocks u and 6. We can represent an initial 
state as follows: 
clear(b) + 
on(b, u) +- 
on(a,floor) + 
To represent a simple move action, we introduce a predicate that indicates what 
was moved, what it was moved from, and what is was moved to: 
move(Block, OldSupport, NewSupport). Then we can represent the acceptable pre- 
conditions of the action with clauses like the following: 
move( Block, OldSupport, floor) + 
on ( Block, OldSupport), 
1 identical ( OldSupport, floor ) , 
clear ( Block) 
move (Block, OldSupport, Support) +- 
clear ( Support), 
on ( Block, OldSupport), 
7 identical ( Block, Support) ,
clear ( Block) 
We can represent the effects of a move with a sentence like the following: 
move (Block, OldSupport, Support ) -+ on( Block, Support) A clear( OldSupport) 
This can be expressed as two Horn clauses, but then it should be kept in mind that 
6Bibel underestimates the difficulty of representing his approach in Horn-clause, resolution-based 
approaches. He suggests that the “linearity” constraint used for connection proofs could be applied 
directly in Horn-clause resolution proofs [l, p. 1291, but this idea is mistaken, as shown by his own 
Figure 1, in which the resolution proof corresponding to a simple plan is shown to lack “linearity”. 
‘The reason I focus on the planning strategies of Warren and Bibel is that they are so directly 
expressible in our framework. Both use the proof context to indicate the notions of “before” and 
“after” the action. This rather confusing and inelegant feature of their approach is avoided in other 
formulations-see especially Kowalski’s [15]. These more elegant formulations are also naturally 
expressed in metatheoretic terms, as noted by Kowalski [15, p. 1361, and with a little effort can also be 
represented with a formulation similar to that used here. 
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on(a,b) 
I I I 
holds holds move(b.a,floor) 
[si preserved1 [si preserved1 
on@,4 -identical(a,floor) clear(b) 
I 
holds 
[in si] 
I 
holds 
[in si] 
FIGURE 3. A planning-problem proof tree. 
one move action suffices to make both consequents true: 
on ( Block, Support) + move( Block, OldSupport, Support) 
clear ( OldSupport) + move ( Block, OldSupport, Support) 
A minor problem is raised by this Horn reformulation of the clause for move. 
An action typically makes several things true, but in a Horn-clause system we must 
use different clauses to establish each of the different (atomic) conclusions. Yet 
this will remove the one-to-one correspondence between plans and proofs, and it 
also introduces inefficiency in having to find “proofs” of the same action more 
than once. For these reasons, we can add rules for on and clear that say they 
already hold: 
on ( Block, Support) + holds 
clear ( OldSupport) + holds 
And then we put a constraint on the occurrence of holds nodes in the proof to the 
effect that the parent is made true by an action that has already been performed. 
More precisely, holds nodes are allowed only if their parents are preserved by 
earlier actions and true in the initial state sit or if they are established by an earlier 
action and preserved thereafter. (In the tree displayed in Figure 3, we represent 
the former justification of the holds relation with the annotation “in si” when 
there have been no earlier actions and with “si preserved” when the earlier actions 
have preserved the relevant features of the initial state si.) 
Most Horn-clause resolution systems reason backward from the goal (i.e. from a 
negative clause). That means that the needed actions will be found in reverse 
order, and the preconditions for the actions immediately prior to the final state 
may have been established not in the initial state but by previous actions. When we 
speak of an “earlier” or “previous” action we mean one that occurs later in the 
proof. The conditions on holds nodes will be enforced with respect to nodes 
occurring later in the proof. 
Applying 7. to this theory, we can establish correct representations of its 
proofs, and some of the proofs do correspond to valid plans. For example, a proof 
tree for +- on(a, b) is shown in Figure 3, with annotations on the holds nodes to 
indicate their justifications. This proof corresponds to the following plan for 
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achieving o&a, b) from the initial state clear(b), on(b, a), on(a, floor): 
move(b,a,floor);move(a,floor,b). 
In effect, it is proofs of this kind that are found by Warren’s and Bibel’s systems. 
With a correct formulation of the holdsjust@ed(Proof> constraints on the 
occurrences of holds in a given Proof we could formulate our planning problems 
as follows: Given an atomic goal G and the basic theory of the domain S, obtain a 
proof tree Proof that satisfies holds_justified(Proof) by finding a suitable refuta- 
tion of TJG) U T&S). The sequence of actions can then be collected in the reverse 
order of their preorder occurrence in the tree. The plan corresponding to the 
proof tree displayed in Figure 3 can thus be obtained as an instance of pfun(Plan) 
provable in a theory containing the result of applying TV to our basic theory and 
the following clause: 
plan( Plan) +- on( a, b, Proof), 
holds justified ( Proof ) , 
plun_in_proof (Proof, Plun) 
While this representation of the problem is correct, it is not feasible. Once 
again, the solution strategy with a left-to-right theorem prover is, in effect, the 
terribly inefficient “generate-and-test” approach. Entailments of the original, overly 
general theory are generated and then tested against the constraints. Since in 
many problems the constraints rule out most of the generated cases, it would be 
much more efficient to apply the tests as soon as possible, to partial proofs, rather 
than generating complete proofs before testing them. We will consider how to 
formulate a logical representation of the problem that can be more efficiently used, 
after considering some other applications of our technique. 
Another problem with our representation of plans is that the proofs specify a 
total ordering of the steps of the plan, backtracking to find alternative orderings 
when necessary. A metatheoretic approach which uses more efficient partial 
orderings of subplans (as in [7, 221) is under development. 
3.3. Natural-Language Parsing 
A division of labor between levels of representation has been used, if only 
implicitly, in many approaches to parsing. Many parsers can be seen, at some level 
of abstraction, as using rewrite rules together with additional principles which 
“filter” out some of the derivations allowed by the rewrite rules. This “filtering” is 
done partly by the action of “agreement rules” and similar principles whose 
domain is relatively restricted. 8 The more challenging job for the parser is to 
properly enforce conditions that are not naturally stated as requirements on sister 
nodes, conditions that depend on larger portions of the structural representation. 
These conditions have prompted a great variety of special and complex parsing 
*For example, most PROLOG parsers for fragments of natural language fit this description. An 
appendix of [24], for example, presents a DCG recognizer with tests. Without the tests, the DCG 
corresponds to an overly general grammar. The tests, in effect, filter out the unwanted derivations from 
the overly general grammar. 
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mechanisms. Our approach allows a simple and elegant logical representation of 
such conditions to be used directly. 
A simple example suffices to illustrate the metalogical approach to parsing.’ 
Pereira and Warren [24] define an elegant and efficient “definite-clause grammar” 
(DCG) representation of context free grammars. Strings in the extensions of 
nonterminal categories are represented with “difference lists”-pairs of lists LO, L 
that represent the string consisting of the elements of L after the elements of LO 
have been removed from the tail of L. With this representation, there is a simple 
“translation” from CFGs to definite clauses (DCs) that can be efficiently used with 
“left-to-right” Horn-clause proof techniques. The context-free derivation trees for 
the grammar correspond to logical derivation or proof trees in the definite-clause 
representation, and so it is natural to attempt to represent constraints on accept- 
able structural representations as constraints on logical derivations. 
A definite-clause grammar can easily be extended to enforce feature agreement. 
The following definite-clause grammar with features will suffice to illustrate the 
use of Chomskian constraints: 
s(LO,L) -np(F,Znda,LO,Ll),vp(Ll,L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) + name( LO, L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) +det(LO,Ll),n(Ll,L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) + det( LO, Ll), n( Ll, L2), sbar( L2, L) 
np( F, Index, LO, L) + truce( Index, LO, L) 
np( +wh, Index, LO, L) * ref_pro( LO, L) 
truce( Index, L, L) + 
sbar( LO, L) +- comp( LO, Ll), s( Ll, L) 
comp( LO, L) + np( + wh, Index, LO, L) 
vp( LO, L) + verb( LO, Ll), np( F, Index, Ll, L) 
name([mulylL], L) + 
det([thelL], L) + 
4[maWl, L) + 
reZ_pro([whojL], L) + 
verb([fikeslL], L) t 
In this simple grammar, special subclasses of np are singled out by the +wh and 
- wh features. Relative pronouns like “who” are + wh; phrases like “the man” 
and “the man who mary likes” are - wh; and the special category truce, which 
always expands to the empty string, is the only noun phrase that can be either 
+ wh or -wh. Also, notice that every np has an uninstantiated (and hence 
universally quantified) argument, Znda, which will play a special role in enforce- 
ment of the constraints. 
‘This cxampl:: is treated in detail in [33]. 
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np(-wh,A,[mary,likes.maryl,Pikes,maryl) vtillikes,maryl,ll) 
I 
name([mary,likes.maryl.Ilikes,maryl) ve b(@ikes.maql.lmaryl) np(-wh,BJmarylJl) 
I 
name(lmaryl.11) 
FIGURE 4. A proof tree for +- s([maly, likes, mmy], [ 1). 
np VP 
name verb nP FIGURE 5. A parse tree for the sentence “mary likes mary”. 
I 
name 
I 
mary likes maiy 
According to this theory, the set of sentences includes “mary likes the man”, 
“the man who mary likes likes mar-y”, “ the man who likes mary likes mary”, “the 
man who likes the man who likes mary likes mary”, and so on. Notice, though, that 
the set also includes “likes”, “likes mary”, “likes the man likes”, and other strings 
that are not English sentences. We can eliminate the acceptance of these latter 
strings by imposing constraints on derivations. The similarity between grammatical 
derivation trees and proof trees from a definite-clause representation of the 
grammar is clear. lo Consider the p roof tree of Figure 4. This corresponds to a 
parse tree that would usually be displayed in the form shown in Figure 5. In the 
remainder of this section we will display the more readable parse trees as 
abbreviations for the corresponding proof trees, and constraints on these proof 
trees will be used to block the derivation of ungrammatical strings. 
For purposes of illustration, we will use three constraints that are simplified 
versions of constraints actually proposed in government-binding theory.” Our first 
constraint is a simplistic rendering of the “Scriterion”: an np that is immediately 
dominated by camp is in an A-position, and every np must either be in A-position 
or else coindexed with exactly one np that is in A-position [37]. The simpler 
condition we want to impose here can be expressed in the following way: 
1. A theta condition. If camp immediately dominates an np, that np must be 
coindexed with a trace that is not dominated by camp. 
“This correspondence, suggested in [24], is precisely specified in 1341. 
“A formalization of these constraints that is not simplified is presented complete detail in [341. 
